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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Agency-Intentional Torts-Liability of the Master
Although there are early cases to the contrary,1 it is now well settled
that the master may be held liable for the intentional torts of his servant.2 The liability of the master for such tortious conduct is said to
'MECHEM, LAW OF AGENCY §499 (3d ed. 1923); 57 C. J. S., MASTER AND
SERVANT §572 (1936).
'Gillis v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 223 N. C. 470, 27 S. E. 2d 283
(1943) ; Hammond v. Eckerd's, 220 N. C. 596, 18 S. E. 2d 151 (1942) ; Long v.
Eagle Co., 214 N. C. 146, 198 S. E. 573 (1938) ; Dickerson v. Atlantic Refining
Co., 201 N. C. 90, 159 S. E. 446 (1931).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

depend upon whether the servant was acting within the scope of his
employment.$ This rule is based on the theory that the master's work
is being performed and that the master is in a better position to minimize
the loss by preventing or spreading it.4
In the case of Charles Stores Co. v. O'Quinn,5 the plaintiff was
criminally prosecuted on a charge of stealing a blouse which he had
found in his car and attempted to exchange. After being acquitted the
plaintiff brought an action in the federal district court against the defendant company for malicious prosecution on the ground that the
prosecution was instituted by the manager of the defendant's store.
The district court found that since the title to the blouse was in doubt,
the manager possessed the implied authority to recover the defendant's
blouse by the criminal suit.6 On appeal, the circuit court, reversing the
lower court, 'declared that the title to the blouse was never in question
and therefore the manager did not act within the scope of his authority
in instigating the action. The latter court stated,7 "It is too clear for
argument that the recovery of stolen property, that had been in undisputed possession of the store manager for nearly a month before the
arrest, was not the purpose of the prosecution." Since the cause of action arose in North Carolina, both courts applied the North Carolina
law under the Erie doctrine.
Ordinarily it is held to be outside the scope of an employee's authority to prosecute an offender even where the offense is committed against
the employer's property, unless the prosecution was previously authorized or subsequently ratified. Authority for the prosecution, however,
may be implied when the action is brought by an employee who is intrusted with the custody of property for the purpose of protecting, preserving, or recovering such property.8 Where the action is brought
merely for the purpose of vindicating justice or punishing the offender
no liability rests upon the master.9
The North Carolina courts have experienced great difficulty in determining what circumstances make the question of implied authority
one for the jury. Thus, a carrier was held not liable as a matter of law
AGENCY §219(1) (1936).
'Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 YALE L. J. 584
'RFSTATEMENT,

(1929).

178 F. 2d 372 (4th Cir. 1949).
O'Quinn v. Charles Stores Co., 86 F. Supp. 240 (M. D. N. C. 1949).
Charles Stores Co. v. O'Quinn, 178 F. 2d 372, 376 (4th Cir. 1949).
'Hammond v. Eckerd's, 220 N. C. 596, 18 S. E. 2d 151 (1942).
'In Daniel v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 136 N. C. 517, 522, 48 S. E. 816, 818 (1904)
where a passenger was arrested in a hotel room and charged with larceny of the
company's money at the instigation of the company's agent, the court dismissed
the case, saying: "A servant intrusted with his master's goods may do what is
necessary to preserve and protect them, because his authority to do so is clearly
implied by the nature of the service, but when the property has been taken from his
custody, or stolen, and the crime has already been committed, it cannot be said that
a criminal prosecution is necessary for its preservation and protection."
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where its dispatcher prosecuted a passenger who refused to abide by
the carrier's segregation regulations ;1o but an earlier case allowed the
jury to determine whether a carrier was liable where its driver wrongfully accused and prosecuted a passenger who refused to pay his fare."
In the former case, it might well be argued that the dispatcher's action
was for the purpose of enforcing the master's regulations and not for
the object of punishing the offender, thereby presenting a proper question for the jury.
In another case where a customer was prosecuted by an employee
for uttering a supposedly worthless check, the jury was allowed to find
the master liable since the action was commenced to collect the master's
debt ;12 but where a manager was expressly forbidden, except at his own
risk, to accept checks, and the agent prosecuted a party for supposedly
issuing a bad check, the court held the act unauthorized. 13 It seems
that in the latter case there was evidence of implied authority to prosecute inasmuch as the manager, though assuming personal responsibility
for the checks, was permitted to vest the title in the principal by daily
depositing them to the principal's bank account. Thus, the manager
14
was at least partially serving the master's business.
Cited in the principal case are several false arrest cases which follow
the same general pattern as those of malicious prosecution. To hold
the master liable for a false arrest instigated by his servant, the act
must be done for the purpose of protecting his master's property or of
furthering the master's business. So where the defendant's foreman had
plaintiff arrested to get him "out of the way" so that the foreman could
string telephone lines across the objecting plaintiff's land, the jury was
allowed to find the defendant company liable. 15 Similarly, an employer
has been held liable where his manager arrested a salesman suspected of
embezzlement.' 0
In Hammond v. Eckerd's of Asheville,"' cited in the instant case,
a cigar clerk followed a customer out of a drug store, accused him of
"0Pridgen v. Carolina Coach Co., 229 N. C. 46, 47 S. E. 2d 609 (1948).
" Kelly v. Durham Traction Co., 132 N. C. 368, 43 S. E. 923, rehearing denied,
133 N. C.418, 45 S.E. 826 (1903).
"Dickerson v. Atlantic Refining Co., 201 N. C. 90, 159 S. E. 446 (1931), 10
N. C. L. REv. 90.
"Lamm v. Charles Stores Co., 201 N. C. 134, 159 S. E. 444 (1931), 9 N. Y.
U. L. Q. REv. 238.
" Nelson Business College v. Lloyd, 60 Ohio St. 448, 54 N. E. 471 (1894) (janitor pushed electrician off table so janitor could finish cleaning).
P.Jacklson v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 139 N. C. 347, 51 S. E. 1015 (1905).
"Kelly v. Newark Shoe Store Co., 190 N. C. 406, 130 S. E. 32 (1925). Cf.
West v. Messick Grocery Co., 138 N. C. 166, 50 S. E. 565 (1905) (client not liable
for attorney's arrest of debtor); Lovick v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 129 N. C. 247,
40 S. E. 191 (1901) (client not liable for attorney's arrest of witness leaving
court's jurisdiction).

But ef. Parrish v. Boysell Mfg. Co., 211 N. C. 7, 188 S. E.

817 (1936) (employer not liable, master's property not being recovered).
"7220 N. C. 596, 18 S. E. 2d 151 (1942), 11 FORDHAM% L. REv. 314 (criticizing
the holding).
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stealing cigars, and caused him to be searched. A divided court dismissed the customer's action for false arrest on the ground that the
clerk's act was not done to protect the master's property, but merely to
vindicate justice since the cigars had already been stolen. It was aptly
pointed out in the dissenting opinion that the cigar clerk was in hot
pursuit of the offender with the avowed purpose of recovering his master's property and that the question of authority should have been determined by the jury. In Long v. Eagle Co.,1 8 a case almost identical
on its facts, the court reached a result opposite to the holding in the
Hammond case. A possible distinguishing feature is that in the Eagle
case the arrest was instigated by an assistant manager rather than a
clerk.
In the principal case the court seemed to rely in part on an express
provision in the employment contract forbidding the manager to arrest
or prosecute an offender. Like provisions have received little consideration by the court in many of the intentional tort cases. Thus, in a case
concerning defamation, 19 an employer was held liable where a manager
followed a customer to a parking lot and there accused her of stealing
a package from the store. The court held that there was sufficient
evidence to warrant the submission of the case to the jury in spite of
the fact that such acts were violative of direct and positive instructions
to the contrary. This result seems sound. If it were otherwise, an
employer could rid himself completely of vicarious liability by the simple expedient of instructing his employees to commit no torts.
Analogous to the holding in the instant case are those cases involving
assaults by servants. The master is generally held liable if the assault
is actuated at least in part by a purpose to serve the master or protect
his property. Under this rule a master has been held liable where he
20
authorized some force, and excessive or improper force was used,
or where an assault occurred during a foreman's inspection of an em" Long v. Eagle Co., 214 N. C. 146, 198 S. E. 573 (1938). In Kelly v. Newark
Shoe Store Co., 190 N. C. 406, 409, 130 S. E. 32 34 (1925), the court stated: "The
term 'manager' applied to an officer or representative of a corporation, implies the
idea that the management of the affairs of the company has been committed to
him with respect to the property and business under his charge. Consequently his
acts in and about the corporation's business, so committed to him, is within the
scope of his authority.... The term 'general manager' may imply still greater
authority, and although limited to the branch store at Wilmington, it still may
imply authority to act in emergencies, or generally, as the principal officer of the
corporation in reference to the ordinary business and purposes of the company in
the condluct of such store."
" Gillis v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 223 N. C. 470, 27 S. E. 2d 283
(1943). Cf. West v. Woolworth Co., 215 N. C. 211, 1 S. E. 2d 546 (1939) (employer liable for employee's slander of customer) ; Sawyer v. Norfolk & S. Ry.,
142 N. C. 1, 54 S. E. 793 (1906) (employer liable for employee's slander of former
employee) ; Strickland v. Kress & Co., 183 N. C. 534, 112 S. E. 30 (1922) (employer not liable for employee's slander of former employee).
'0 Snow v. De Butts, 212 N. C. 120, 193 S. E. 224 (1937). Cf. Wilson v.
Singer Sewing Machine Co., 184 N. C. 40, 113 S. E. 508 (1922).
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ployee's machine;21 but where an assault was committed in spite or
hate, or to carry out an independent purpose of the servant, the master
22
was not liable.
The result reached in the principal case seems to be in line with many
of the North Carolina cases in which intentional torts are involved. But
the court appears to be particularly harsh in denying the plaintiff recovery because the prosecution was instigated for a crime already committed against the master's property instead of for the purpose of recovering such property. This distinction made by the court seems more
apparent than real. Although the immediate object of the manager's
action might well have been to vindicate the law and punish the offender,
yet it cannot be denied that such prosecutions do tend to discourage
future criminal acts and thereby indirectly serve the master's interests.
This deterrent effect appears especially pertinent here in view of the
fact that the manager had been previously bothered by shoplifters. This
would seem to be sufficient evidence of an intention to further the master's business and to protect his property so as to leave the question
for the determination of the jury.
In conclusion it might be pointed out that the North Carolina courts
have been more willing to submit to the jury cases involving negligent
torts of the servant as distinguished from willful torts. Perhaps this
action on their part has not been deliberate.2
Theoretically, however,
such a distinction has no basis and it is to be hoped that in the future,
where doubt exists as to the purpose for which a servant acted, such
doubt will be resolved by the jury whether his act be classified as negligent or intentional.
GEORGE J. RABIL.
Associations-Injunctive Relief Against Violation of
Its Rules by Members
It appears well settled that the constitution, rules, regulations and
by-laws 1 of a voluntary association constitute a contract between the
Fleming v. Tarboro Knitting Mills, 161 N. C. 436, 27 S. E. 309 (1913).
In Snow v. De Butts, 212 N. C. 120, 193 S. E. 224 (1937), where a manager
assaulted the plaintiff who had opposed the defendant employer's petition to the
Corporation Commission, the defendant was held not liable although the act was
committed with an intent to benefit the master. A later case refused to let the
jury consider the master's liability where an employee assaulted a person outside
the master's premises as a result of an argument arising inside the store. Robinson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 216 N. C. 322, 4 S. E. 2d 889 (1939), 18 N. C. L.
22
22

REv. 163 (1940).
2 It seems that as a practical solution to the tendencies of juries to find the
"deeper pocketed" employer liable, the courts, particularly in the field of agency
law, have frequently exercised judicial restraints in an effort to mete out justice
as they see it in the individual cases.
So long as the issue is the enforceability of the constitution, rules, regulations,
charter or by-laws, no distinction is necessary between them, and for purposes of
this note they are used synonymously.
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association and its individual members which the courts will enforce
if the rules and regulations are not unreasonable, immoral, unlawful or
contrary to public policy.2
This proposition was involved in a recent North Carolina case, the
widely discussed "rump sales" case.3 There, the Bright Belt Warehouse
Association sought to enjoin several of its members from conducting
auction sales of leaf tobacco in the defendants' warehouses without compliance with certain rules and regulations promulgated by the plaintiff's
Board of Governors. 4 Upon the verified complaint a temporary restraining order and notice to show cause were issued. At the hearing
the defendants' demurrer ore tents was overruled and the restraining
order continued as a temporary injunction until final hearing. In reversing this decision, the North Carolina Supreme Court held only that
the regulation in question was invalid as beyond the Board's delegated
powers.5 The Court, however, recognized the previously mentioned rule
2 North Dakota v. North Central Ass'n, 23 F. Supp. 694 (E. D. Ill. 1938);
Walker v. Medical Soc'y, 247 Ala. 169, 22 So. 2d 715 (1945) ; Local Union No. 57
v. Boyd, 245 Ala. 227, 16 So. 2d 705 (1944); Levy v. Magnolia Lodge, 110 Cal.
297, 42 Pac. 887 (1895) ; Sult v. Gilbert, 148 Fla. 31, 3 So. 2d 729 (1941) ; South
St. Joseph Live Stock Exchange v. St. Joseph Stock Yards Bank, 223 Mo. App.
623, 16 S. W. 2d 722 (1929) ; Height v. Democratic Women's Luncheon Club, 131
N. J. Eq. 450, 25 A. 2d 899 (1942) ; Robinson v. Dahm, 94 Misc. Rep. 729, 159
N. Y. Supp. 1053 (1916); Weighers, Warehousemen and Cereal Workers' Union
38-123 v. Green, 157 Ore. 394, 72 P. 2d 55 (1938) ; Manning v. San Antonio Club,
63 Tex. 166 (1885).
Bright Belt Warehouse Ass'n v. Tobacco Planters Warehouse, Inc., 231 N. C.
142, 56 S. E. 2d 391 (1949).
'The Association at its annual meeting adopted a resolution authorizing its
Board of Governors "to announce and publish such rules and regulations as may
in the opinion of the Board best provide for the proper and orderly marketing and
handling of tobacco on auction warehouse floors." Pursuant to this delegation of
authority, the Board met and adopted the following resolution:
"1. That an essential element of a bona fide sale of tobacco at auction is that
there shall be assigned to such sale an adequate set of buyers prepared to bid at
competitive sale. The minimum requirement of an adequate set of buyers is the
following:
"(a) Buyers for each of the three major domestic tobacco companies (Reynolds
Tobacco Company, American Tobacco Company, and Liggett & Myers Tobacco
Company), and
"(b) Buyers of at least three other recognized companies purchasing tobacco
for export or for export and domestic consumption.
"2. No warehouse should offer tobacco for sale at auction unless and until an
adequate set of buyers as defined above has been assigned to and secured for such
sale."
Four sets of buyers were assigned to the Rocky Mount market by the three
major domestic companies, permitting four simultaneous sales, but the defendants
conducted an additional or fifth sale when the buyers present did not include representatives from each of the three major companies. The plaintiff sought to enjoin
this practice as a violation of its rules and regulations.
The Court found that the authority delegated to the Board of Governors to
promulgate regulations as to marketing and handling tobacco was insufficient to
give the Board power altogether to prohibit auction sales, otherwise fair and in accord with announced marketing regulations, because of the absence of buyers of
either of three named manufacturers.
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6
and added that rules and regulations may be enforced by injunction.
Considering the facts of the case; the only logical inference from this
language is that injunction is a proper remedy on the part of the association to restrain its members from violation of the reasonable and
lawful rules and regulations of the organization.
At first blush injunctive relief might seem routine if the charter and
by-laws constitute an enforceable contract between the association and
its members. Surprisingly enough, the diligent counsel in the suit were
unable to uncover a square holding either way.7 Thus, the statement
of the Court seems to be without direct authority. The question then
arises as to just how far the Court is likely to go in applying its language.
In attempting to answer this question, a brief consideration of the
general nature of voluntary associations and of the attitude of the courts
toward judicial interference in their internal affairs seems in order.
The term "association" is one of vague meaning. It is used to indicate
a body of individuals or entities which have joined together to promote
some proper objective.8 Generally, the word covers a multitude of organizations ranging from labor unions and trade associations to social
clubs and fraternities.
Associations, as a rule, neither need nor want judicial enforcement of
their rules and by-laws. 9 A national labor union would have little occasion to call on the courts to enjoin a local union from violating its rules
since the national union has powerful means of its own, such as a cancellation of the local charter, to insure adherence. And a trade association
would be hesitant to seek judicial aid, even if it were experieicing difficulty with recalcitrant members over price or production standards, for
fear of government investigation or regulation. The value of autonomy
to all voluntary associations, by their very nature, is great.1°

" The plaintiff here is an incorporated association, but there is no real difference
between unincorporated and incorporated associations insofar as the issue is the
binding effect of the constitution, rules and by-laws. Most of the law relied on
by the Court falls under the heading of "Associations" which deals largely with
unincorporated associations. 7 C. J. S. Associations, §11.
"Nor has the note writer been able to discover a case in point. The nearest
case seems to be Sea Gate Ass'n v. Sea Gate Tenants Ass'n, 6 N. Y. S. 2d 387
(1938). There the plaintiff association got an injunction to prevent the violation
of one of its rules prohibiting picketing on the property of the members. It did
not appear, however, that the defendants were members of the plaintiff organization.8
W. R. Roach & Co. v. Harding, 348 Ill. 454, 181 N. E. 331 (1932) ; People v.
Brander, 244 Ill. 26, 91 N. E. 59 (1910) ; Venus Lodge v. Acme Benevolent Ass'n,
231 N. C. 522, 58 S.E.2d 109 (1950).
'The United States Senate Committee Trade Association Survey indicates that
trade association executives do not believe that they have available sanction with
which agreements on price or production can be enforced. TNEC Monograph No.
18, Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power 51-53 (1941).
"0It is to be noted here that the Board of Governors of the Bright Belt Warehouse Association apparently will not make an issue of any possible "rump" sales
in 1950, despite the language of the Supreme Court in the principal case. The
1950 marketing regulations were adopted without major change from those which
prevailed in 1949. Raleigh News and Observer, March 8, 1950, p. 1, col. 7.
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Coupled with the reluctance of associations to resort to the courts,
there is a parallel reluctance on the part of the courts to interfere in the
A great many jurisdictions
internal affairs of these organizations."
insist that a property right be abridged before there can be judicial
interference.' 2 Others hold that the proceedings of the association are
subject to judicial review only where there is fraud, oppression or bad
faith,1a or the proceedings are violative of the laws of the land, 14 or are
ultra vires' 5 or otherwise illegal.' 6 Even when willing to take jurisdiction, some courts require that the injured party must first have exhausted all administrative remedies within the association before seeking
judicial relief.'1 Any analysis or discussion of these limitations is beyond the scope of this note.' 8
Clearly, an association is entitled to injunctive relief against its
members to restrain them from violating their contracts with the parent
body where there is specific statutory authority to that effect. The
North Carolina Co-operative Marketing Act 19 is an example of this type
statute. The very lifeblood of the co-operative depends on its ability to
enforce members' agreements to sell only to the co-operatives. The
statute acknowledges this need and the public interest involved.2 0 There
was also an element of public interest in the "rump sales" case, expressly
recognized by the Supreme Court, and the Court seems to have been
on sound ground in indicating that injunction would have been the
proper remedy for this association, had the rules in question been within
the powers delegated to the Board of Governors. Difficulties, however,
"In re Rosenbaum Grain Corp., 13 F. Supp. 601 (N. D. I11. 1935); Local
Union No. 57 v. Boyd, 245 Ala. 227, 16 So. 2d 705 (1944); Board of Trade v.
Nelson, 162 Ill. 431, 44 N. E. 473 (1896).
"Elfer v. Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass'n No. 12, 179 La. 383, 154 So. 32
(1934) ; Crutcher v. Eastern Div. No. 321, 151 Mo. App. 622, 132 S. W. 307
(1910); Rogers v. Tangier Temple, 112 Neb. 166, 198 N. W. 873 (1924); Carey
v. Int'l Brotherhood of Paper Hangers, 123 Misc. Rep. 680, 206 N. Y. Supp. 73
(1924) ; Kenneck v. Pennock, 305 Pa. 288, 157 Atl. 613 (1931) ; Fraser v. Buck,
234 S. W. 679 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
" Most Worshipful United Grand Lodge F. & A. M. v. Murphy, 139 Md. 225,
114 AtI. 876 (1921) ; Plemenic v. Prickett, 97 N. J. Eq. 340, 127 At. 342 (1925).
"Elfer v. Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass'n No. 12, 179 La. 383, 154 So. 32
(1934) ; Fraser v. Buck, 234 S. W. 679 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
" Williams v. District Executive Board, U. M. W. of A., 1 Pa. D. & C. 31
(1921).
.llee v. James, 68 Misc. Rep. 141, 123 N. Y. Supp. 581 (1910).
"CHarris v. Missouri P. R. R., 1 F. Supp. 946 (E. D. Ill. 1931) ; People ex rel.
Michajlowski v. Tanaschuk, 317 Ill. App. 380, 45 N. E. 2d 984 (1942); Carson
v. Gikas, 321 Mass. 468, 73 N. E. 2d 893 (1947) ; Hickey v. Baine, 195 Mass. 446,
81 N. E. 201 (1907) ; Robinson v. Dahm, 94 Misc. Rep. 729, 159 N. Y. Supp. 1053
(1916); Loeffler v. Modern Woodmen, 100 Wis. 79, 75 N. W. 1012 (1898).
" For discussions of adjudications of internal disputes see Notes, 7 CORNELL
L. Q. 261 (1922), 24 MrcH. L. Ray. 82 (1925), 34 VA. L. REv. 352 (1948), 25
WAsr. U. L. Q. 621 (1940), 58 YALE L. J. 999 (1949), 31 YALE L. J. 328 (1922),
30 YALE L. J. 202 (1920).
'. C. GEN. STAT. §54-152(c) (1943).
20 See Tobacco Growers Co-operative Ass'n v. Battle, 187 N. C. 260, 261, 121
S. E. 629, 630 (1924).
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are in store if injunction is to be applied to breaches of by-laws of other
associations, such as clubs and fraternal organizations.
It seems clear that the courts should have jurisdiction to interfere
in the internal affairs of voluntary associations, and that such jurisdiction should include power to grant injunctive relief to an association to
restrain the violation of rules and regulations by its members. But it
seems equally clear that the courts should not feel compelled to exercise
this jurisdiction unless the circumstances of the particular case warrant
interference. The contract theory relied on by the Supreme Court should
not rigidly require the equity court to become the final interpreter and.
enforcement agent of the laws and rules of all voluntary associations,
clubs, and fraternal orders.
Other theories concerning judicial interference in the internal affairs
of associations have been advanced. Professor Chafee, considering cases
of wrongful expulsion, suggests that tort is the proper basis for relief,
that the wrong consists in the destruction of the relation between the
member and the association. 2 1 The argument seems valid with regard
to expulsion cases, but it could hardly be contended that the member is
committing such a tort when he violates a by-law. The "rump sales"
in the principal case could scarcely be considered torts.
A recent federal case, expressly repudiating the "property right"
limitation, holds that equity should protect "personal rights" in a political organization by injunction. 22 This case presents a definite forward step in the field of association law, but its reasoning is not applicable to the problem at hand. There is no "personal right" in the association which would be abridged by a member's failure to adhere to
by-laws and regulations.
The heterogeneous character of the organizations falling under the
label "Association" is the seat of much of the difficulty in attempting to
work out any rule of law which can be consistently followed. Specific
performance of contract by injunction seems the most logical theory on
which to base a decision allowing an association injunctive relief for the
enforcement of its rules and regulations. This would enable the courts
to be free to act or to refuse to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with
1 Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARv. L.
Rav. 993, 1007 (1930).
-- Berrien v. Pollitzer, 165 F. 2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1947). The suit involved a
dispute within a non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of securing

equality for women. Certain of the defendants, purporting to act as the National
Council of the Party, adopted a resolution temporarily excluding from the Party
headquarters all members of an "insurgent" group. One of the "insurgents," who
had received no notice of the proposed resolution or of the meeting at which it
was adopted, sued to enjoin this exclusion. The district court refused to assume
jurisdiction
on the ground that a court of equity can interfere only to protect
"property rights."
The court of appeals reversed, holding that "personal rights"
of the plaintiff had been infringed, and that jurisdiction was warranted regardless
of whether she had an interest in the assets of the association.
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a discretion guided by certain criteria such as: (1) bad faith on the
part of the member in violation of the rules; (2) disruptive friction
which may be aroused within the organization by judicial interference;
(3) the presence or absence of any interest of substance; (4) public
interests and interests of third persons; (5) seriousness of the breach ;28
(6) probable effect of resort to the internal remedies of the association
if such remedies might accomplish the desired result; (7) adequacy of
other judicial remedies.
Whether or not the court will grant injunctive relief in the final
analysis should depend on the particular circumstances of each case.
The eventual answer must be one based upon practical considerations, a
balance of the seriousness of violation and the need for relief against
the disadvantages of intervening in the affairs of the particular association involved.
W. BRAXTON SCHELL.
Constitutional Law-Due Process-Admissibility of
Confessions and Police Abuses
The Supreme Court of the United States, in an effort to protect the
individual against certain police practices, is imposing on the state courts
a new test for the admissibility of confessions. The test might be called
the "pressure-abuses" test. It is prescribed for the states under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is designed to
displace the old "testimonial trustworthiness" test. The latest application of the new test came in three cases decided last summer, Watts v.
Indiana," Turiwr v. Pennsylvania,2 and Harris v. South Carolina.3
The old test, generally accepted over the country, was simply this:
If a confession were the result of such pressure that there would be a
fair chance that the accused would tell a lie, the confession was excluded. The courts talked of "voluntary" and "involuntary" confessions, of promises, threats, and physical abuses, but the underlying idea
of nearly all the cases was that a confession would be excluded if it were
given under such pressure that it would be untrustworthy.4 The extent
of police abuses-illegal detention, delay in arraignment, failure to ex" Dean Pound suggests that the chancellor might well ask these questions: Is
the injury serious enough to warrant the extraordinary interposition of equity?
Is it serious enough to warrant the expense and consumption of public time involved in a judicial proceeding? In cases involving fraternal orders, churches or

secret societies, is it serious enough to balance the practical difficulty involved in the
court's endeavor to learn, interpret and apply the laws and customs of the organization? Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality,

29 HARv. L. REv. 640, 680 (1916).
1338 U. S. 49 (1949).
'338 U. S. 62 (1949).
3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§822, 824 (3d ed. 1940).

'338 U. S. 68 (1949).
But Dean McCormick dis-

agrees that the sole underlying basis for the confession rule is desire to protect
against untrustworthiness. McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of

Evidence, 16 TEXAs L. REv. 447, 451-457 (1938).
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plain rights, etc.-was not considered, except in so far as those abuses
might tend to make the confession untrustworthy from the evidence
standpoint. North Carolina, too, followed the "testimonial trustworthiness" test.5
The test which the United States Supreme Court has now prescribed
for the states is a stricter one. It says that not only will a confession
be excluded which is testimonially untrustworthy, but also a confession
will be excluded which, even though trustworthy, is obtained by some
degree of pressure coupled with substantial police abuses.
In federal courts if a confession is obtained after the proper time for
arraignment has passed, it is inadmissible regardless of its trustworthiness and regardless of the decorum of the police. 6 This federal court
rule is based on the idea that there is little chance for police abuse if
arraignment is early. The rule is one of evidence, not an expression of
a constitutional right. The new state court test is much more nebulous.
It demands a weighing of pressures and abuses, and it is made no easier
to grasp and apply by the fact that the Supreme Court continues to talk
of "voluntary" and "involuntary," language traditionally associated with
the old test. Indeed it is only by examining the fact situations in particular cases and by reading some of the dissents that we can be sure
a new test has been laid down.
Perhaps the first indication that the Supreme Court was going to
demand more of state courts than testimonial trustworthiness came in
Ward v. Te.ras,7 decided in 1942, but it was not until the famous case
of Ashcraft v. Tennessee8 that the new test became clearly discernible.
Ashcraft, a white man of good reputation and standing in the community, was arrested on a Saturday evening and questioned continuously
until early Monday morning, when he confessed. There was no warrant for his arrest, and he was not arraigned until after his confession
'"The test accordingly laid down in the more recent decisions is whether the
confession 'was made under circumstances that would reasonably lead the person
charged to believe that it would be better to confess himself guilty of a crime he
had not committed."' STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §183 (1936).
'Upshaw v. United States, 335 U. S. 410 (1948) ; McNabb v. United States,
318 U. S. 332 (1942).
7316 U. S. 547 (1942). The Court cited the following cases, but it is to be
noted that none of them clearly adopts the new test: Wan v. United States, 266
U. S. 1 (1924) (arose in federal court); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278
(1936) (state court did not contend confessions anything but coerced) ; Chambers
v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940) (case might be considered first to apply new test,
but not clear that old test of testimonial trustworthiness not applied); Canty v.
Alabama, 309 U. S. 629 (1940) (per curiam) ; White v. Texas, 310 U. S. 530
(1940) (brief opinion; not clear new test applied) ; Vernon v. Alabama, 313 U. S.
547 (1941) (per curiam) ; Lomax v. Texas, 313 U. S. 544 (1941) (per curiam,
but facts given in state court opinions suggest that this decision looks toward new
and stricter rule; police abuses seem less extreme than in some earlier cases;
Lomax v. State, 136 Tex. Cr. R. 108, 124 S. W. 2d 126 (1939), second appeal, 142
Tex. Cr. R. 231, 144 S. W. 2d 555 (1940), revfd again per curiant, 313 U. S. 544
(1941), third appeal, 146 Tex. Cr. R. 531, 176 S. W. Zd 752 (1943)).
0322 U. S. 143 (1944).
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on Monday. He was kept incommunicado and deprived of sleep. Even
so there was evidence that his confession was not the result of intimidation by the police. Mr. Justice Black for the majority talked of the
"inherently coercive" 9 situation and stressed the abuses of power by the
police. He was not very greatly concerned with the testimonial reliability of the confession. Mr. Justice Jackson, writing a three-judge
dissent, called attention to the fact that a new test was being imposed on
the state courts.' 0
The Ashcraft doctrine was reaffirmed in Malinski v. New York."
Malinski was arrested before eight o'clock one morning and confessed
late that afternoon. In the meantime he was held without warrant in
a Brooklyn hotel room and made to strip. He may have feared a "shallacking," but he was not questioned continuously. Mr. Justice Douglas,
for the Court, talked the old language of fear and coercion, but it seems
clear that a much stricter test than that of testimonial trustworthiness
was applied; the Court seems to have had one eye on police abuses. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, concurring, said that the whole proceedings "offend
those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the
most heinous crimes.' 2
Again in Haley v. Ohio's a majority of the Court applied the new
test. There a fifteen-year-old Negro boy was arrested about midnight
and questioned for five hours or so until he confessed. The four dissenting justices seemed to think that something nearer the old test of
testimonial trustworthiness should have been applied, for Mr. Justice
Burton said, "The question in this case is the simple one-was the
confession in fact voluntary?"' 14 But the majority held that, in view of
the boy's age and race and in view of the intensity of the questioning
and of the fact that he was without counsel, there was a "disregard of
the standards of decency." As in the Ashcraft case, the opinion emphasized the "inherently coercive" situation and refused to accept the jury's
verdict that this particular defendant was not in fact coerced to the
point of untrustworthiness.
The three cases decided last summer all involved Negroes arrested
without warrants' 5 and held for five or six days of more or less intensive questioning before confessions were obtained. No counsel or relatives were permitted to see the persons accused, and no preliminary
examinations were held until after the confessions were obtained. In
Id.at 154.
20 Id. at 156.
11324 U. S. 401 (1945).
22 Id.at 417.
"332 U. S. 596 (1948).
21 Id. at 615.
"In Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U. S. 68 (1949), a warrant had been issued
charging the accused with stealing a pistol, but the warrant was not read to him,
and he was not informed of the charge against him. In actuality he was wanted as
a suspected murderer.
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one of the cases the accused was kept for two days in a place called
"the hole,"' 16 where he had to sleep on the floor. In another the accused
was an illiterate, 17 and in all of the cases there were other aggravating
circumstances. It seems from the facts given in the state and federal
reports that the evidence of actual coercion in these three cases was
greater than in the Ashcraft case and perhaps greater than in the Ward,
Malinski, and Haley cases. And, although it is difficult to evaluate the
various police abuses, they would seem to have been as flagrant in these
three cases as in any of the four earlier cases.' 8 Indeed the decision in
the three latest cases, in view of Ward, Ashcraft, Malinski, and Haley,
seems to have been a logical necessity. The fact that the state courts
in the three cases did not use the new test may indicate either' an unawareness that the old test has been changed or a dislike of the new
one. 19
The new test rests on a handful of opinions and a few per curiam
decisions. In all of the cases with full opinions, the Ward case alone
excepted, there were strong dissents. The Ashcraft and Watts cases
were six-three decisions. The Malinski, Haley, Turner, and Harris
cases were five-four decisions. The permanence of the new test seems,
therefore, uncertain, especially in view of the fact that two of the justices who have consistently been with the majority, Justices Murphy and
Rutledge, have died since the last cases were decided.
PRESSURE-ABUsES TEST AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

It has long been established that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not fasten on the states eighteenth or nineteenth
century common law modes of trial and procedure. Rather the Clause
guarantees "immunities . . . implicit in the concepts of ordered lib-

erty, ''20 "standards of fundamental fairness," 2' principles of justice so
rooted in the traditions and consciences of our people as to be ranked
1" Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49 (1949).
"Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U. S. 68 (1949).
"sUnder any system of weighing police abuses, clearly one important element
would be length of time that a suspect is unlawfully detained before the confession
is made. In the Ward case the time was perhaps 40 hours; in Ashcraft, 36 hours;
in Malinski, 10 hours; in Haley, 5 hours; while in the three latest cases the time
was five to six days. In the Ashcraft and Haley cases it might even be argued
that there was no unlawful detention since the periods of detention were presumably
at times magistrates were not available. Of course such other elements of police
abuse as over-lengthy periods of questioning, failure to explain constitutional rights,
and deprivation of sleep and food must be considered in connection with the length
of detention and with the nature of the person accused.
10 State v. Harris, 212 S. C. 124, 46 S. E. 2d 682 (1948)
(court mentioned
federal decisions but stated, without explaining, that they did not apply) ; Watts
v. State, 82 N. E. 2d 846 (Ind. 1948) (no mention of United States Supreme Court
decisions on admissibility); Commonwealth v. Turner, 358 Pa. 350, 58 A. 2d 61
(1948) (express statement that old rule on admissibility was proper one).
20 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S.319, 324 (1937).
21Fay v. New York, 332 U. S.261, 294 (1947).
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as fundamental. 2 2 Indeed the Clause as construed seems nearly as
large as fairness and justice themselves. It is clear that any conviction
based on a confession that is not trustworthy would be a deprivation
of life and liberty without fairness and would therefore violate the
Clause.2 3 But the new test says that an element which is to be considered along with pressure on the accused is police abuse. Does such
a test represent a radical departure in interpretation of due process?
It should be noted first that the Clause has not been limited to a
requirement that the proper result be reached in the particular trial;
the Court has gone further and demanded that that result be reached
with some dignity. Thus a reversal may sometimes be had even though
24
the defendant is clearly guilty as charged.
But has the Clause as traditionally interpreted extended to pre-trial
events? Some of the language in cases, other than those which enunciate the new test, indicates that the Clause does extend beyond the trial
and protect against substantial pre-trial irregularities.2 5 Logic seems to
demand this result; if at the trial itself we are concerned, not solely
with getting a fair conviction, but also that that conviction be obtained
with some dignity of method, why should that same dignity of method
not be required of pre-trial events? An abuse before the trial is no less
a violation of "civilized standards,"2 6 no less a denial of "fundamental
principles of liberty." 27 The pre-trial irregularity, however, is different
in one important respect: a new trial cannot correct it; to hold it fatal
would be to turn the criminal lose. The Supreme Court's solution is to
consider the pre-trial irregularity but to insist that it contribute in some
way to the result of the trial. A new trial which disregards the fruits
of the irregularity is held to cure the defect. In Lisenba v. California-"8
there were police abuses which the Court condemned, but the abuses had
not led to the challenged confession. The Court refused to reverse for
the abuses alone since they had not "fatally infected the trial."2 9
2" Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934).
*E.g.,Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936).
2

"E.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 535 (1927). General statements of scope
of Due Process Clause support this view. E.g., Carter v. Illinois, 329 U. S. 173,

175 (1946) ("ultimate dignities of man") and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S.
319, 324 (1937) ("ordered liberty").
2' Chambers
v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, 236 (1940) (Fourteenth Amendment
protects people "charged with or suspected of crime"). But in other cases there
is language which sounds as if the Due Process Clause, except for its effect in
restraining substantive laws of states, is limited to the trial itself. E.g., Frank v.
Mangum, 327 U. S. 309, 340 (1915) ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 110
(1908) ("Due process requires that the court ... shall have jurisdiction . . . and
that there shall be notice and opportunity for hearing."). But such restrictive language has been used in cases involving only the trial itself; pre-trial irregularities
were not under consideration.
" Cf. Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401, 414 (1945) (Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring).
"7Cf.Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 316 (1926).
28314 U. S. 219 (1941) ; accord, Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596 (1944).
-'314 U. S. 219, 236 (1941).
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It thus appears that the pressure-abuses test is not a radical departure in the theory of due process. But in practice the test obviously
carries the Clause into new areas, and the question which immediately
arises is: How far will this extension of application go? If the Court
now frankly sets about to reform the manners of state police officials,
will there be any stopping place short of complete standardization of
police and court procedure throughout the country?
One answer to this widespread fear is that the Court has a long
tradition of self-restraint on due process questions. The cases are full
of statements that the states are free to choose their own methods for
dealing with crime so long as "fundamental rights of the prisoner shall
not be taken from him arbitrarily."30 "We adhere to this policy of selfrestraint and will not use this great centralizing Amendment to standardize administration of justice and stagnate local variations in practice." 3 '
Certainly it is to be hoped that the Court will continue to recognize
the value of local responsibility and initiative in the administration of
justice. If the Court sits over the nation exercising its conscience on
every detail of police procedure, state courts and legislatures will tend
to abdicate their duties. State citizens will learn to feel that the solution to every police abuse comes, not from local and state initiative, but
from the remote and standardizing opinions of the Court in Washington.
Local experimentation will die along with local consciences. But if the
police abuses are as gross as were those in the cases last summer, perhaps occasional interference from the Supreme Court will prove to be
just the spur needed by state citizens and courts.
PRESSURE-ABUSES TEST AND LAw ENFORCEMENT

It remains to be considered whether the new test on admissibility is
desirable from the standpoint of its effect on law enforcement.
Miss Irene Savidge and Sir Leo Money were sitting on a bench in
Hyde Park in 1928 when they were arrested by two policemen on a
charge of behaving "in a manner reasonably likely to offend against
public decency." They were taken before a magistrate, who dismissed
the charge, but later the Director of Public Prosecutions asked that a
statement be obtained from Miss Savidge. She was visited at her place
of employment and voluntarily agreed to attend an inquiry at Scotland
Yard. The inquiry lasted about four hours. Tea was served at four
o'clock, and Miss Savidge and the two officers enjoyed a cigarette
apiece. About six-thirty Miss Savidge was driven home by the chief
32
inspector.
" Frank v. Mangum, 327 U. S. 309, 334 (1915) ; Avery v. Alabama, 308 U. S.
444, 446 (1940) (Fourteenth Amendment "not intended to bring to the test of a
decision of this Court every ruling made in the course of a state trial").
" Fay v. New York, 332 U. S. 261, 295 (1947).
"2 Reported in National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement,
Report No. 11, Lawlessness in Law Enforcement, 259-261 (1931).
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This interrogation of Miss Savidge precipitated a -debate on the
floor of Commons, a commission of three to investigate the case, and a
Royal Commission of eight to investigate the entire field of police powers
and procedure-so sensitive are the English to police abuses!
The English police are told that after they have made an arrest they
must forego any questioning at all until the prisoner is in the police
station.3 3 Then the charge is explained to the prisoner, and he is told
that he is not obliged to talk but may do so if he wishes and that anything said may be used in evidence. Even if the prisoner then chooses
to make a statement, no questions may be asked him except to clear up
ambiguities. If the police have made no arrest but are merely seeking
a statement from a prospective witness, it is suggested that they preface
their remarks as follows: "I am a police officer. I am making inquiries
into (so-and-so), and I want to know anything you can tell me about
it. It is a serious matter, and I must warn you to be careful what you
34
say."
The new pressure-abuses test is a development in the direction of
Efigland, but the Supreme Court in this test is far indeed from prescribing English rules for our police. 35 The Court is not attempting to
outlaw all arrests on suspicion nor all questioning before arraignment.
In the Watts case the Court said that the evil aimed at was "protracted,
systematic and uncontrolled subjection of an accused to interrogation." ' 0
It may be that the Court would even sanction an inquisitorial system
modeled on that of the Continent provided the state adopting it also
adopted that system's safeguards. 37 The attempt is to attain, whatever
the system, the "rudimentary requirements of a civilized order."3 8
In 1931 the Wickersham Commission reported that the extortion of
confessions by the police by mental or physical pressure was widespread
in this country. 39 Although it mdy be hoped that such abuses are less
" Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedure, CmD. No. 3297 at 114.
Quoted 3 WIGIORE, EVIDENCE §847.
34Ibid.
" It is true, of course, that the problem of law enforcement in England is different from that in this country. England's well-selected and well-trained police
operate in a small country and deal with a society which has a low crime rate and
a strong tradition of respect for the police and of co-operation with them. Bdt
England and America are alike in sharing the accusatorial, as opposed to the
inquisitorial system; in both countries formal presentment and the privilege against
self-incrimination are basic assumptions in the administration of justice. Hence
we may expect to learn something from England's experience in the hope of
moving toward the "order, dignity, urbanity, and dispatch" which seem to characterize her criminal law. See HOWARD, CRIMINAL JusTcE Im ENGLAND (1931).
O338 U. S. 49 (1949).
" Ibid. The Court pointed out that under the accusatorial system the accused
is "protected by the disinterestedness of the judge in the presence of counsel. See
Keedy, The Preliminary Investigation of Crime it; France, 88 U. OF PA. L. REV.,
692, 708-712 (1940)."

8Ibid.

"' National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, oP. cit. supra
note 32, at 153.
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frequent now, the. three cases of last summer indicate that long detentions and protracted examinations are not yet unknown. It has often
been argued that such practices are necessary to law enforcement. 40
But England and those American cities which are almost completely
free of the third degree provide a powerful counterargument. 41 What
the third degree gains in the immediate case it seems to lose in the long
run. When illegal procedures are adopted to achieve a worthy end,
not only are the liberties of the individual infringed, but the police sacrifice some of the public's respect and willingness to co-operate. Secret
detention naturally tempts to a distortion in Court of the facts of the
detention. The end result is that the police are demoralized, and the
public, suspecting abuse, fails to hold the police in the high esteem which
proper enforcement of the law demands. 42 It seems logical to assume,
moreover, that the possibilty of illegal detention and questioning discourages scientific investigation and leads to reliance on "unimaginative
'43
crude force."
It is not within the scope of this note to say what the precise limitations on pre-arraignment police practices should be. But surely detention on mere suspicion of from five to seven days, deprivation of
counsel and friends, and intensive questioning through the detention are
an unjustifiable invasion of the liberty of one who is presumed to be
innocent. Furthermore such practices, it is believed, are harmful in the
long run to the police departments and to the cause of efficient law enforcement. Civil suits and criminal prosecutions against the officers
have proved ineffective. 44 The exclusion of confessions obtained by
such extreme abuses seems a salutary development in criminal law.
JOHN P. KENNEDY, JR.
Domestic Relations-Child's Interest in the Parental RelationSuit by Infant for Enticement of Mother
One of the ideas most often asserted and most generally accepted
in the field of jurisprudence in recent years is that law should be squared
with the knowledge -developed by the social sciences.1 This does not
" For an excellent recent statement of this argument see Inbau, The Confession
Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. REv. 442 (1948).
" See survey of third degree practices in fifteen representative cities, National
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, op. cit. supra note 32, at 83152, 188-189.
"See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, 240 n. 15 (1940).
" Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596, 606 (1948) (Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring). See National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, op. cit.
supra note 32, at 187-189; 8 WIGMORE, EvImzNcE §2251.
For a delightful discussion of the whole problem of police abuse see Warner,
How Can the Third Degree Be Eliminated?, 1 BILL OF RIGHTS REv. 24 (1940).
Also McCormick, Admissibility of Confessions, 24 TEXAS L. Rv. 239 (1946).
"ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 28-31, 66 (1947).
'POUND, INTRODUcTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 75 (1921).

98 (1922) ;

CARDOzo, THE
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mean that the law should bend and sway with every new theory in a field
where many theories and theorists compete for attention; it does mean
that social sciences bring to light a solid body of factual information,
and that, to the extent that the law rests upon fact, it should take into
account facts as they are demonstrated by the social sciences. A case
which raises a problem upon which the social sciences shed genuine
light is Henson v. ThomWS.

2

In that case two minor children, suing by their father as next friend,
asked for 'damages from a third person, alleging that from time to time
that person enticed their mother from the family home for the purpose
of engaging in criminal conversation with her, thereby goading their
father into leaving home. The alleged results of these acts were to disgrace the children socially, and to deprive them of the parental affection,
training, and care of both their father and mother. From the trial
court's overruling of a demurrer ore tenus to the complaint, the defendant appealed. In a 5-2 decision the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the trial court, declaring that no such cause of action is
recognized in North Carolina. 3
Mr. Justice Barnhill for the majority reasoned that: (1) Such a
cause of action was not known at common law, and since no statute
creates such a cause of action the court is "not permitted to find a way
out [italics added] for plaintiffs by engaging in judicial empiricism,"
and (2) "It is not for the courts to convert the home into a commercial
enterprise in which each member of the group has a right to seek legal
redress for the loss of its benefits." 4
"No one would question the fact that a child has an interest in all
the benefits of the family circle," acknowledges the majority,5 but any
consideration of those interests in reaching the instant decision is neglected. The interests of the child in an undisturbed home include those
of an economic nature, such as food, clothing, and physical care; those
of the personality, such as psychologic support, affection, and moral
training; those in the nature of honor, such as social acceptability, and
a name free from the taint of immorality.
The child's economic interest in the parental relationship goes beyond the bare minimum of support. The maximum benefits from the
family income are realized only when both parents are present in the
home. Where the mother is absent, part of the income is used to provide substitutes for her care, management, and service. Each member
of the family suffers a proportional economic loss. Where the father is
absent but is meeting the obligation of support, an economic loss is sus2231 N. C. 173, 56 S. E. 2d 432 (1949).
'Henson v. Thomas, 231 N. C. 173, 176, 56 S. E. 2d 432, 434 (1949).
4Ibid.

'Henson v. Thomas, 231 N. C. 173, 175, 56 S. E. 2d at 434 (1949).
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tained through similar considerations. The division of income between
two households prevents the family members from receiving benefits
equal to that of an undisturbed family unit. Where the father is absent
and the burden of support is shifted to the mother, a greater economic
loss is sustained by each family member.
In a study in North Carolina of the income of families supported
solely by wage or salary in 1939, the following results were obtained:
The median income of such families was $1,360. The one-child families
having a male head and the wife present had an income of 92.6 per cent
of the median; such families with the wife absent had an income of 78.7
per cent, and where such families had a female head, the income was
only 65 per cent of the median.; The composition of the family group
has a marked bearing on the adequacy of the income for the benefit of
the family members.
The child has an interest in the support and care of its parents because of their effect on his physical and mental health. Common sense
and the conclusions of psychologists' studies agree that the child's sense
of security and well-being is based upon its early experience of parental
care and affection. 7
In the following summation from the work of an eminent psychiatrist
and physiologist8 it will be noted that it is not the overt "breaking" of
the home that affects the child so much as the -disharmony, resentment,
contempt, and conflicts in the relations of the parents. In the instant
case such strained relations are aggravated, if not initiated by the defendant's wrongful interference.
The family structure is the continuing solid support which is necessary to the child's physical existence. The loss of such support arouses
fear in the child just as the loss of the support of terra firma during an
earthquake may cause insane fright in adults. The initial physical support is from the mother's feeding, clothing and nursing. Later, the
father and siblings contribute to the life of the child. The child 'directly
experiences the loss of support by separation from the parents, discord
and quarrels, and feelings of insecurity from disharmony between the
parents. The deprivation of assistance can only arouse anxiety and
feelings of insupport in the helpless child. The breaking up of parents
is likely to divide the child's loyalties within himself and produce feelings of insecurity. "Thus 'growing-up' involves a graded series of
removals of support, and if a firm, resilient structuration of personality
is to result, these removals should not be too alarming or too abruptly
imposed."9
What of Children in North Carolina, Report of a Study by The Committee on

Services for Youth, State of North Carolina State Planning Board, 1947, p. 20.

Shirley and Poyntz, The Influences of Separation from the fother on CidlJOURNAL OF PsYcHOLoGy 251 (1941).
"MURRAY, EXPLORATIONS IN PERSONALITY 292 (1938).

dren's Emotional Responses, 12
"Ibid.
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A study of these matters from another perspective corroborates these
observations. In a comparison of the backgrounds of 56 psychotic children from Massachusetts' mental hospitals with those of 56 average
children of the same age and sex, thirty of the psychotic group, as compared with 10 in the average group, had lost either father or mother by
death, divorce, separation or desertion. The study concludes: ". .. it
can be stated without qualification that children have the right to expect
of their homes and society the same privileges that we as adults, demand
in our lives, namely, security, justice, love and opportunity."'1
The home is the child's primary and continuing source of training in
the traits of honesty and acceptable social conduct. The loss of parental
care and affection deprives the child of essential emotional nourishment.
The parent's sympathy is the child's first lesson in kindness and consideration of the interests of others." Parental aid in adversities is the
child's source of encouragement to renewed confidence and courage.
From the standpoint of pride and honor, the child also has an interest in a life of normal social relations, free from the stigma of immorality and disgrace brought about by the acts of an intruder in the
family group. There can be no other conclusion than this, that the intruder who lures away a parent and breaks up the home has committed
an offense inflicting a grievous injury upon the innocent child. There
is no reason why such a wrongdoer should not bear the financial consequences of his misdeeds.
Consideration of the interests of society in the fostering of undisturbed family units leads to the same conclusion. The interests of society are not thwarted, but are furthered by securing the interests of
the child in this situation. Society has an interest in being free from
the shifted economic burden of care and support of the children, in having mentally mature and psychologically adjusted citizens, and in having
citizens instilled with moral consciousness and ethical conduct.
Increasingly the burden of support in the broken home is shifted to
society. North Carolina, recognizing the need to conserve and strengthen
family life, assumed the burden of financial assistance in 1937 by its
Aid to Dependent Children Act.12 The appropriations of the state alone
for this service increased from $520,000 in 1944-1945 to $1,467,500 in
1949-1950.1a In 1942 the number of children in families receiving
grants in aid was 21,950; at the close of 1948 the number had increased
0
oYerbury and Newell, Genetic and Enwiromnental Factors in Psychoses of
Children, 100 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHIATRY 599 (1944).
" Bridges, FactorsContributing to Juvenile Delinquency, 17 JOURNAL OF CRIMitNAL LAW AND CRMINOLOGY 351 (1926).
12
N. C. GEN. STAT. §108-44 (1943).
13Linquist
and Woodson, Families Receiving Aid to Dependent Children it;
North Carolina, North Carolina State Board of Public Welfare, Information Bulletin No. 14 (1949) p. 5. In 1944-1945 funds from federal sources were $956,381
and from county sources were $432,460.
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to 29,388. More than half these families were headed by the mother,
and "[a] most 20 per cent of the mothers were carrying on alone because their husbands were absent from the home and providing no support for the family. Divorce, separation, or desertion was the explana'
tion for most of these broken homes." 14
Where the maintenance of
any semblance of a family unit is not possible, the economic cost of support is shifted to society through state services and private charities. 15
Society has an interest in having a maximum of emotionally stable
and mentally healthy individuals in its composition. This interest goes
beyond the mere public expense of those children requiring institutional
care. It goes to society's interest in being free from the offenses of
juvenile delinquents and adult criminals. Here the home is the first line
of action for producing morally, as well as emotionally, adjusted citizens.
Studies of the backgrounds of juvenile delinquents reveal a persistently prominent frequency of broken homes.:' In a 1923 study of
1,649 boys in New York state correctional institutions, 45.2 per cent
came from broken homes. The study and its comparison with a control
group showed "an intimate association between abnormal marital relations of parents, i.e., death, divorce, or separation among parents, and
juvenile delinquency." '
Of the 12,052 delinquency cases handled by
the North Carolina juvenile courts from 1939 to 1944, 49.5 per cent of
the children were reported as from broken homes.'
One writer, viewing similar results, remarks, "We need not repeat the truism that adult
crime is to a large degree rooted in the delinquency of early life."' 9
Not only should law be squared with facts revealed by the social
sciences, but law should also take morality into account. The majority
opinion in the instant case avoids any intimation that justice according
to law should bear a relationship to moral principles. By man's inherent
moral discernment the act here complained of is immoral and constitutes
a grievous wrong. Of all his physical desires man perceives none to
have a higher value or produce a higher good than those resulting in the
creation of the family and parent-child relationships. 20 The instant
decision "finds a way out" for one who has violated these morally valu' 4 1d. at 10.
" What of Children in North Carolina, op. cit. supra note 6, at 11. Private
finances furnish 94 per cent of total expenditures for institutional care of children
in North Carolina.
" A representative selection from the many studies on this matter is summarized
in TAPPAN, JUVENILE DELINQTENCY 134 (1949).
"?Slawson, Marital Relations of Parents and Juvenile Delinquency, 8 JOURNAL
OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 278, 285 (1923).
1" SANDERS, JUVENILE COURTs IN NORTH CAROLINA 94, 98 (1948).
In the delinquency cases where the marital status of the parents was known, the home was
broken by divorce, separation, or desertion in 13.4 per cent of the cases handled by
courts in rural counties, and in 19.2 per cent of the cases handled by courts in cities.
"' Henting, Juvenile Delinquency and Adult Disorganization, 35 JOURNAL OF
CRIMfNAL LAW AND CRimINOLOGy 87 (1944).
2'6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

65 (1931).
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able desires of man and turned them to the satisfaction of his own lust.
Possibly because of the reasons underlying the generally halting
development of family law 2 1 the securing of the interests of children has
been the most belated. The right of the child to its very life was secured
only after centuries of crusading and education by the Judaic, Christian,
and Mohammedan religions. 22 The Roman father could kill or sell his
child into slavery at his will.2 3 In English common law the father could
not kill or sell his child, but in other matters his power was unquestioned. The courts would not interfere with his custody of the child,
despite the father's open dereliction, and the child had no right to enforce parental care or support.24 In America, the child's right to support is made a legal duty of the parent by statute, and it is not dependent
upon the parent's custody or moral inclinations. 25 Recent legal history
has been one of increasing legislative and judicial concern with the welfare and the rights of children. 26 Some courts recognize that the early
common law concept of the family unit, wherein all rights were vested
in the husband and father, has through centuries of change in social
structures been replaced by the concept of the family as a cooperative
unit with mutual rights and -duties among all the members. In viewing
this change as reflected in modern legislation and judicial rules, these
courts hold that the minor child has legally protected rights in the
family relationship against interference by outsiders, and that such an
interference as an enticement of a parent from the home is an invasion
of the child's rights for which the child can maintain a suit for dam27
ages.
In refusing the child's cause of action in the instant case, the court
referred to the decision in Snall v. Morisan.2s That case held that
COOLY, TORTS 464 (3d ed. 1906) ; HARPER, TORTS 553 (1933); POLLOCK,
2"

TORTS 225 (12th ed. 1923) ; Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations,
14 MICH. L. REV. 177, 187 (1916).
2Fisher, Pater Fainilias-ACooperative Enterprise,41 ILL. L. Rav. 27 (1946).
Literature of early ages offers the accounts of Agamemnon who sacrificed Iphigenia
to procure a fair wind for Troy, of Jephthah who slew his daughter pursuant to a
vow made before battle, and of Virginius who killed his only child rather than
surrender
her into the wardship of the unjust judge.
223 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENcES 375 (1931).
24 Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort, 2 Russ. 1, 38 Eng. Rep. 236 (1827).
214
VERNIER, AmERIcAN FAmILY LAWS 18 (1936).
28 Fisher, Pater Familias-A Cooperative Enterprise, 41 ILL. L. Rv. 35-46
(1946). A recent judical enlargement of such rights is that of the child to recover for a prenatal injury in Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio
St. 114, 87 N. E. 2d 334 (1949), 28 N. C. L. Rav. 245 (1950).
" Daily v. Parker, 152 F. 2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945) ; Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp.
281 (W. D. Mich. 1949); Johnson v. Luhman, 330 Ill. App. 598, 71 N. E. 2d 810
(1947); Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 27 N. W. 2d 543 (1949). Contra:
Edler v. MacAlpine-Downie, 180 F. 2d 385 (D. C. Cir. 1950) ; McMillan v. Taylor,
160 F. 2d 221 (D. C. Cir. 1946); Rudley v. Tobias, 84 Cal. App. 2d 454, 190 P.
2d 984 (1948) ; Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn. 145, 56 A. 2d 768 (1947) ; Morrow v.
Yannantuono, 152 Misc. 134, 273 N. Y. Supp. 912 (Sup. Ct. 1934); Garza v.
Garza, 209 S. W. 2d 1012 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
185 N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 12 (1923).
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an unemancipated minor child, living as a member of the family, may
not maintain an action against its father for a negligent injury. There,
the court felt that the interests of society in the preservation of the
family as an economic and educational institution, and the interests of
the other family members in these same benefits forbade such an intrafamily lawsuit. 20 The reasons underlying this policy are lacking in the
instant case. Indeed, a situation more violently dissimilar is difficult
to picture! Here the family is already disrupted. 30 Here the action is
not against a parent but against one, not only a stranger to the family
relationship, but an intruder whose very act was the causal force in
destroying the home.
Precedents in North Carolina decisions recognize principles which
would have sustained allowing the cause of action in the instance case.3 '
A minor child living in the family home has been allowed to sue its
father's employer for an injury inflicted by the father's negligence. The
policy protecting the father did not extend to insulate the employer from
such an action.32 A minor child has been allowed to sue its parent
directly for support,3 3 although the child could not maintain such an
action at common law 34 and no statute creates such a cause of action

in the child. In the light of these decisions the court's contention in the
instant case that it is powerless to provide a remedy is not persuasive.
RICHARD E. WAPDLOW.

Eminent Domain-Principles and Procedure-Power to Condemn
Dwelling-houses and Surrounding Premises for Highway Purposes
Eminent domain' is the power of the sovereign to take and use, alienate, or destroy for the benefit of the public any species of property whatsoever lying within its territorial jurisdiction. 2 It is, in effect, a funda"-Accord, Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F. 2d 677 (D. C. Cir. 1948) ; Mesite v.
Kirchenstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 At. 753 (1929) ; Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss.
703, 9 So. 885 (1891) ; Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905) ; Wick
v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N. W. 787 (1927). Contra: Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84
N. H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S. E. 538
(1932).
" The policy preventing a minor child from suing its parent has been held inapplicable when the family unit was already disrupted. Green v. Green, 210 N. C.
147, 185 S. E. 651 (1936) ; Pickelsimer v. Critcher, 210 N. C. 779, 188 S. E. 313
(1936).
"1For a discussion of the legal bases of such a cause of action and analagous
North Carolina decisions see Note, 28 N. C. L. Rav. 113 (1949).
-Wright v. Wright, 229 N. C. 503, 50 S.E. 2d 540 (1948).
'a Green v. Green, 210 N. C. 147, 185 S. E. 651 (1936) ; Pickelsimer v. Critcher,
210 N. C. 779, 188 S.E. 313 (1936).
14 Huke v. Huke, 44 Mo. App. 308 (1891); Mortimore v. Wright,
6 M. & W.
481, 151 Eng. Rep. 502 (1840) ; Shelton v. Springet, 11 C. B. 452, 138 Eng. Rep.
549 (1851).

'Grotius, an eminent publicist of the seventeenth century, originated
See Wissler v. Yadkin River Power Co., 158 N. C. 465, 74 S.E. 460
"Griffith v. Southern Ry., 191 N. C. 84, 131 S. E. 413 (1926);
Duplin Highway Comm'n, 183 N. C. 211, 111 S. E. 176 (1922);
Greenville, 154 N. C. 490, 70 S. E. 919 (1911).

the phrase.
(1912).
Clifton v.
Jeffress v.
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mental condition attached to the ownership of property. Every title
is in this respect defeasible. 3 The power is an inherent attribute of
4
sovereignty.
The fundamental limitation upon the right of eminent domain is that
property can be condemned only for a public purpose.5 No such provision is to be found in the North Carolina Constitution, but the principle
is treated as so fundamental that statutes in violation thereof are held
unconstitutional and void.( To meet this requirement, the use intended
must be ". . . by or for the government, the general public, or some portion thereof a such, and not ... by or for particular individuals or for

the benefit of particular estates. ' ' 7 Many jurisdictions hold it sufficient
if the intended use directly promotes the public welfare,8 but North
Carolina adopts a stricter test, holding that the general public must have
the right to use the property.0 Originally, property could be taken only
for essential purposes, but the rule has been relaxed, so that now property can be taken for such non-essential purposes as parks, playgrounds,
public buildings,' 0 scenic highways, : 1 cartways,' 2 etc.' 8 The question of
whether a proposed condemnation is for a public purpose is open to
Legal writers, in theorizing, often treat the power as arising from an implied
condition in the original grant from the sovereign to the individual. The sovereign
is said to have reserved the right to retake the property, should the interests of
the public so require. Raleigh & G. R .R. v. Davis, 19 N. C. 451 (1837) ; MmLs,
EMINENT DOmAIN §1 (1879).
' Although the Constitution of North Carolina contains no reference to eminent
domain, it was held in 1837 that the power of the state to condemn is "indispensable, and incontestible." Raleigh & G. R. R. v. Davis, 19 N. C. 451 (1837);
Jeffress v. Greenville, 154 N. C. 490, 70 S. E. 919 (1911) ; State v. Jones, 139
N. C. 613, 52 S. E. 240 (1905).
Charlotte v. Heath, 226 N. C. 750, 40 S. E. 2d 600 (1946); Reed v. State
Highway Comm'n, 209 N. C. 648, 184 S. E. 513 (1936); Yarborough v. North
Carolina Park Comm'n, 196 N. C. 284, 145 S. E. 563 (1928) ; State v. Tyre Glen,
52 N. C. 321 (1859).
'Cozard v. Hardwood Co., 139 N. C. 283, 51 S. E. 932 (1905).
'Charlotte v. Heath, 226 N. C. 750, 40 S. E. 2d 600 (1946), quoting from
Rindge
Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U. S. 700 (1922).
8
Note, 15 N. C. L. Rav. 361 (1937).
' Cozard v. Hardwood Co., 139 N. C. 283, 51 S. E. 932 (1905) (condemnation
for a private railroad unconstitutional, even though the proposed use would have
developed natural resources, attracted wealth and population, etc.) ; Cook v:
Vickers, 141 N. C. 101, 53 S. E. 740 (1906) (sustaining condemnation for cartway
purposes, under N. C. GEN. STAT. §136-68 et seq. (1943), inasmuch as cartways
are open to the use of the public, even though laid out on application of, paid
for by, and primarily intended for the use of, private individuals). The requirement is that the general public have the right to use, not that it actually use.
And the terms upon which the public may use are subject to legislative regulation.
" Yarborough v. North Carolina Park Comm'n, 196 N. C. 284, 145 S. E. 563
(1928).
" Reed v. State Highway Comm'n, 209 N. C. 648, 184 S. E. 513 (1936).
" Parsons v. Wright, 223 N. C. 520, 27 S. E. 2d 534 (1943) ; Waldroup v.
Ferguson, 213 N. C. 198, 195 S. E. 615 (1938); Cook v. Vickers, 141 N. C. 101,
53 S. E. 740 (1906).
: N. C. GEN. STAT. §40-2 (1943), and annotations, list a multiplicity of public
and quasi-public corporations delegated the power of eminent domain.
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judicial review ;14 but once it has been determined that the purpose is
public, the wisdom, expediency, and proper extent of condemnation are
matters primarily within the political discretion of the legislature and
the grantee of the power. 15
Although no provision in the North Carolina Constitution requires
that just compensation be given for property taken under the power of
eminent domain, 1 3 it was held in 1859 that any legislative act which
attempts to take private property without just compensation is "unconstitutional and void." 17 The principle has never since been questioned. 18
It may be noted that laws passed in the proper exercise of governmental
police powers which merely restrict the use of property, such as zoning
ordinances, -do not, properly speaking, take property by means of eminent domain, and therefore do not require compensation. 19 But governmental immunity extends no further, and compensation must be
given for any direct encroachment upon property rights, even though
the acts are done by express legislative authority, and in the proper
exercise of governmental functions.20
" State Highway Comm'n v. Young, 200 N. C. 603, 158 S. E. 91 (1931) ; Yarborough v. North Carolina Park Comm'n, 196 N. C. 284, 145 S. E. 563 (1928).
A legislative declaration that the condemnation is for a public purpose has persuasive, but not conclusive, weight. Reed v. State Highway Comm'n, 209 N. C.
648, 184 S.E. 513 (1936).
" Charlotte v. Heath, 226 N. C. 750, 40 S.E. 2d 600 (1946) ; Reed v. State
Highway Commn, 209 N. C. 648, 184 S.E. 513 (1936) ; State Highway Comm'n
v. Young, 200 N. C. 603, 158 S.E. 91 (1931); Yarborough v. North Carolina
Park Comm'n, 196 N. C. 284, 145 S.E. 563 (1928). But the court has indicated
that if there is bad faith, or manifest abuse of discretion, it will take cognizance of
these matters. See Selma v. Nobles, 183 N. C. 322, 325, 111 S.E.543, 544 (1922) ;
Yadkin River Power Co. v. Wissler, 160 N. C. 269, 274, 76 S.E. 267, 269 (1912).
" U. S. CoNsr. AMEND. XIV, §1, ". . . nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," ratified in 1868, was in
1896 construed to prohibit states from condemning land without giving just compensation. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Chicago, 166 U. S.226 (1896). The Fifth
Amendment, "... . nor shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation," ratified in 1791, binds only the Federal Government. Staton v.
Norfolk & C. R. R., 111 N. C. 278, 16 S.E. 181 (1892); Raleigh & G. R. R. v.
Davis, 19 N. C. 451 (1837).
'7 State v. Tyre Glen, 52 N. C. 321 (1859).
Early decisions sought to derive
the necessity for compensation from N. C. CoNsT. Art. I, §17: "No person ought
to be . . . deprived of . . .property but by the law of the land." State v. Tyre
Glen, 52 N. C. 321 (1859); Raleigh & G. R. R. v. Davis, 19 N. C. 451 (1837).
But later decisions proudly recognize that the principle is based solely on judicial
fiat. Parks v. Board of County Comm'rs, 186 N. C. 490, 120 S. E. 5 (1923);
State v. Lyle, 100 N. C. 497, 6 S. E. 379 (1888) ; Johnston v. Rankin, 70 N. C.
550 (1874).
' McKinney v. Deneen, 231 N. C. 540, 58 S. E. 2d 107 (1950) ; Lewis v. State
Highway Comm'n, 228 N. C. 618, 46 S. E. 2d 705 (1948) ; Staton v. Norfolk &
C. R. R., 111 N. C. 278, 16 S. E. 181 (1892); Johnston v. Rankin, 70 N. C. 550
(1874).
" McKinney v. Deneen, 231 N. C. 540, 58 S. E. 2d 107 (1950) ; In re Parker,
214 N. C. 51, 197 S. E. 706 (1938). Cf. State v. Tyre Glen, 52 N. C. 321 (1859).
But see N. C. GEN. STAT. §136-19 (1943), concerning scenic easements. (No
cases.)
" Clinard v. Kernersville, 215 N. C. 745, 3 S. E. 2d 267 (1939) (pollution of
stream by discharge from municipal sewage disposal plant) ; Rhodes v. Durham,
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The measure of damages is the difference between the fair market
value of the entire tract immediately before the taking, and the fair market value of the remainder of the tract immediately after the taking. 21
The legislature may provide that damages are to be reduced by special
and general benefits, 22 or by special benefits alone, or that no benefits
shall be offset. 23 At different times in our history, all three rules have
obtained, and all have been sustained by our court as "just compensa25
tion."2 4 Usually, only special benefits are offset.
The North Carolina Constitution declares that no person ought to
be deprived of property "but by the law of the land." 20 With respect
to condemnation, the effect of the provision is to require that the owner
be given reasonable notice, and a fair opportunity to be heard, when
compensation is fixed. 27 It is not necessary that he be heard as to the
necessity for, or proper extent of, condemnation, that question residing
within the legislative discretion.28 It may be noted that the owner has
165 N. C. 679, 81 S. E. 938 (1914)

(pollution of air by noxious odors from mu-

nicipal sewage- disposal plant); Hines v. Rocky Mount, 162 N. C. 409, 78 S. E.
510 (1913) (pollution of air by "foul stench" from municipal garbage and refuse
dump).
2 Proctor v. State Highway Comm'n, 230 N. C. 687, 55 S. E. 2d 479 (1949);
Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Sloan, 227 N. C. 151 41 S. E. 2d 361 (1947);
Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Carringer, 220 N. C. 57 , 16 S. E. 2d 453 (1941).
In assessing compensation, the condemner is considered as having taken an interest
in the remainder of the tract, to the extent of the depreciation in its market value.
Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Rogers, 207 N. C. 751, 175 S. E. 692 (1935) ;
Western Carolina Power Co. v. Hayes, 193 N. C. 104, 136 S. E. 353 (1927); cf.
Clinard v. Kernersville, 215 N. C. 745, 3 S. E. 2d 267 (1939).
" Special benefits are increases in property value "peculiar to the owner's land
and not in common with other landowners in the vicinity." Carolina Power &
Light Co. v. Reeves, 198 N. C. 404, 151 S. E. 871 (1930) ; Ayden v. Lancaster,
197 N. C. 556, 150 S. E. 40 (1929); Campbell v. Road Comm'rs, 173 N. C. 500,
92 S. E. 323 (1917).
Any increase in property value shared by others in the
vicinity is a general, not a special, benefit. Ward v. Waynesville, 199 N. C. 273,
154 S. E. 322 (1930).
22 Miller v. Asheville, 112 N. C. 759, 16 S. E. 762 (1893); Elks v. Comm'rs,
179 N. C. 241, 102 S. E. 414 (1920) ; Lanier v. Greenville, 174 N. C. 311, 93 S. E.
850 (1917) ; Southport, W. & D. M R. v. Platt Land, 133 N. C. 266, 45 S. E. 589
(1903).
2' Elks v. Comm'rs, 179 N. C. 241, 102 S. E. 414 (1920) ; Southport, W. & D.
R. R. v. Platt Land, 133 N. C. 266, 45 S. E. 589 (1903) ; Miller v. Asheville, 112
N. C. 759, 16 S. E. 762 (1893).
2 Under N. C. GEN. STAT. §40-18 (1943) only special benefits may be offset by
those corporations authorized to condemn by N. C. GEN. STAT. §40-2 (1943).
But the State Highway and Public Works Commission, under N. C. GE'. STAT.
§136-19 (1943), may offset both general and special benefits. See Elks v. Comm'rs,
179 N. C. 241, 245, 102 S. E. 414, 416 (1920), for an interesting rationale of the
distinction.
26 N. C. CONsT. Art. I, §17. This language traces its lineage to section 29 of
the Magna Carta.
ITState Highway Comm'n v. Young, 200 N. C. 603, 158 S. E. 91 (1931);
Yarborough v. North Carolina Park Comm'n, 196 N. C. 284, 145 S. E. 563 (1928);
State v. Jones, 139 N. C. 613, 52 S. E. 240 (1905).
28 State Highway Comm'n, v. Young, 200 N. C. 603, 158 S. E. 91 (1931);
Jennings v. State Highway Comm'n, 183 N. C. 68, 110 S. E. 583 (1922) ; Jeffress v.
Greenville, 154 N. C. 490, 70 S. E. 919 (1911) ; State v. Jones, 139 N. C. 613, 52
S. E. 240 (1905).
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no constitutional right to a jury trial in condemnation proceedings, although N. C. GEN. STAT. §40-20 (1943) grants that privilege on appeal to the Superior Court.29
Extensive delegation of the power of eminent domain has frequently
given rise to complex problems of statutory construction. In a recent
case 3o the North Carolina Supreme Court questioned whether N. C.
GEN. STAT. §40-10 (1943)31 which exempts dwellings, gardens, etc.,
from condemnation by the corporations listed in N. C. GEN. STAT. §40-2
(1943), also exempts such property from condemnation for highway
purposes by the State Highway and Public Works Commission (hereinafter referred to as the SH&PWC).32
"In the absence of constitutional or statutory restriction, the power
of the State to appropriate private property to public use exen'ds to
every species of property within its territorial jurisdiction."3 3 There
are no constitutional restrictions in this state, and if any property is
exempt from condemnation, it is only because some statute so provides.3 4 But it is a familiar principle that inasmuch as statutes dele" N. C. CoxsT. Art. I, §19. A condemnation proceeding, in which the amount
of damages is almost invariably the sole issue, "is not a controversy within the
meaning of the Bill of Rights, nor such a trial by jury as that instrument declares
shall be 'sacred and inviolable." Raleigh & G. R. R. v. Davis, 19 N. C. 451
(1837) ; State v. Floyd, 204 N. C. 291, 168 S. E. 222 (1933) ; State v. Jones, 139
N. C. 613, 52 S.E. 240 (1905).
" Proctor v. State Highway Comm'r, 230 N. C. 687, 694, 55 S.E. 2d 479, 484
(1949).
14No such corporation shall be allowed to have condemned to its use, without
the consent of the owner, his dwelling-house, yard, kitchen, garden, or burial
ground, unless condemnation of such property is expressly authorized in its charter
or by some provision of this code."
"' The State Highway Commission was created in 1915. Until 1921 it was a
purely advisory body, with primary control of all highways still vested in the
counties, towns, and other political subdivisions of the state. In 1921, to meet the
requirements of federal aid appropriations, the key act for the present system of
state highways was passed. This act created a statewide system of about 5,500
miles of highways. In 1927 the State Highway Commission was empowered to
take over additional roads, not to exceed 20% of what it had already taken over.
Soon after, Governor Gardner became convinced that the best course was to discontinue entirely state grants of aid to counties for roads, and instead to centralize
control of all public highways in one agency, the State Highway Commission. In
1931 this was done, but the State Highway Commission was authorized to decline
to take over certain highways, in its discretion. In 1933 the State Highway Commission was combined with the Public Works Commission and became the State
Highway and Public Works Commission. N. C. P. L. 1915, c. 113; N. C. P. L.
1921, c. 2; N. C. P. L. 1927, c. 200; N. C. P. L. 1931, c. 145; N. C. P. L. 1933, c.
172; Pate, Highway Administration it the South (1935)
" Parks v. Board of County Comm'rs, 186 N. C. 490, 500, 120 S. E. 46, 51
(1923) ; Selma v. Nobles, 183 N. C. 322, 111 S. E. 543 (1922) ; Clifton v. Duplin
Highway Comm'n, 183 N. C. 211, 111 S. E. 176 (1922).
" Where an act gives "broadly and without restriction the right to condemn
private property for highway purposes, the right so given will include dwellinghouses, tree and yards . . .unless such power is excluded under general or other
State laws applicable." Parks v. Board of County Comm'rs, 186 N. C. 490, 500,
120 S. E. 46, 51 (1923) ; Clifton v. Duplin Highway Comm'n, 183 N. C. 211, 111
S. E. 176 (1922) ; Raleigh, C. & S. R. R. v. Mecklenburg Mfg. Co., 166 N. C.
168, 180, 82 S. E. 5, 10 (1914).
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gating the power of eminent domain are "in derogation of the ordinary
rights of private ownership" they are to be construed strictly against
the delegatee. 35
N. C. GEN. STAT. §136-19 (1943) delegates to the SH&PWC the
power of condemnation for highway purposes 36 and provides that in
exercising that power, "the ways, means, methods, and procedure of
chapter 40, entitled 'Eminent Domain,' shall be used by it as near as the
same is suitable for the purposes of this section." Does this provision
indirectly restrict the power of the SH&PWC to condemn dwellings,
gardens, etc., for highway purposes? Article I of Chapter 40 enumerates
certain corporations and delegates to them the power of eminent domain,
with certain special provisions in that regard, including the provision
in question, that no such corporation shall condemn dwellings, gardens,
etc., unless expressly authorized. Article II prescribes in detail the
procedure to be followed in condemnation proceedings, and except for
the prefatory provision in N. C. GEN. STAT. §40-11 (1943), is not concerned with the nature and extent of the power to condemn, but rather
with the manner in which that power is to be exercised. Originally,
the two Articles were codified in separate chapters,37 but recent codifications have placed them in juxtaposition.3 8 It is apparent that the two
Articles are distinct, one delegating the power of eminent domain to
certain corporations, and delineating the nature and extent of that
power; and the other prescribing the special proceeding to be followed
when that power is exercised.
As noted, N. C. GEN. STAT. 136-19, granting to the SH&PWC the

power, makes reference to Chapter 40 only for the "ways, means, methods, and procedures." It, therefore, seems certain that the legislative
intent was to provide that the SH&PWC should exercise its power of
eminent domain in the manner prescribed in Article II of Chapter 40,
but that an indirect limitation of the power itself was not contemplated.
Neither Article I of Chapter 40, generally, nor N. C. GEN. STAT. §40-10
(1943), specifically, is concerned with "ways, means, methods, and
procedure."
" Board of Education v. Forrest, 193 N. C. 519, 137 S. E. 431 (1927) ; Griffith
v. Southern Ry., 191 N. C. 84, 131 S. E. 413 (1926) ; Carolina & N. R. R. v. Pennearden Lumber Co., 132 N. C. 644, 44 S. E. 348 (1903).
11 N. C. GEa. STAT. §136-19 (1943) actually contains two distinct statutes, one
passed in the initial act of 1921, dealing with the right to condemn for the state
highway system; and the other passed in 1935, dealing with the right to condemn
for the Blue Ridge Parkway. The two statutes are markedly dissimilar, and their
codification into one section has wrought much confusion.
"' The Code of 1883 placed what is now Article I in Chapter 38, Vol. I, entitled "Internal Improvements"; and placed what is now Article II in Chapter 49,
Vol. I, entitled "Railroad and Telegraph Companies." The corporations delegated
the power of eminent domain by Chapter 38 were to follow the procedure set out
in Chapter 49.
" Rev. 1905, Chapter 61, Art. V; C. S. (1919), Chapter 33; N. C. GEN. STAT.
(1943), Chapter 40.
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Even if the exemption of dwellings, gardens, etc., were considered
a way, means, method, or procedure, the same are to be applicable to
the SH&PWC only insofar as "suitable for the purposes of this section." If the SH&PWC were forced to so locate its routes as to avoid
every dwelling-house, garden, yard, kitchen, and burial ground encountered, the development of a state highway system would be seriously impeded. Such a result would hardly be compatible with the
purposes of N. C. GEN. STAT. §136-19 (1943).

N. C. Sess. Laws 1947, c. 806, added a new subsection to N. C. GEN.
§40-2 (1943) which, in effect, gives the SH&PWC the power to
39
condemn land for facilities, a power not theretofore conferred upon it.
Inasmuch as the corporations listed in N. C. GEN. STAT. §40-2 (1943)
are subject to the provisions of N. C. GEN. STAT. §40-10 (1943),40 it
would seem that in granting this additional power by amending N. C.
GEN. STAT. §40-2 (1943), instead of by amending N. C. GEN. STAT.
§136-19 (1943), the legislature intended to subject the power of condemnation for facilities purposes to the "dwelling house" limitation imposed in N. C. GEN. STAT. §40-10 (1943). But inasmuch as N. C. GEN.
STAT. §136-19 (1943) grants the SH&PWC the power of eminent domain for highway purposes, and N. C. GEN. STAT. §40-2 (1943) grants
only the additional power of eminent domain for facilities purposes, only
that latter power should be limited by the provisions of N. C. GEN STAT.
§40-10 (1943). It is hardly probable that the legislature intended, by
the 1947 amendment, to limit indirectly the broad powers of condemnation for highway purposes elsewhere conferred upon the SH&PWC.
LLOYD S. ELKINS, JR.
STAT.

Federal Income Taxation-Sale of Corporate AssetsCapital Gains Tax
When a corporation wishes to sell its assets the problem of capital
gains taxable to the corporation arises. If there has been an appreciation in the value of the assets, as usually there has been, the selling
corporation will be subject to a heavy capital gains tax on this appreciation, and, in addition, its stockholders will be subject to a capital gains
tax on the proceeds of the sale when they are distributed, if the distribu" "The right of eminent domain may, under the provisions of this chapter, be
exercised . . .by the bodies politic, corporation, or persons following...
"9. The state highway and public works commission, for the purpose of acquiring such land or property as may be necessary for the erection of or addition to any building or buildings for the purpose of housing its offices, shops,
garages, for storage of supplies, -material or equipment, for housing, caring
or providing for prisoners, or for any other purpose necessary in its work,
including the administration of the state prison system"
40 Clifton v. Duplin Highway Comm'n, 183 N. C. 211, 111 S. E. 176 (1922)
Raleigh, C. & S. R. R. v. Mecklenburg Mfg. Co., 166 N. C. 168, 180, 82 S. E. 5, 10
(1914).
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tion is in retirement of the outstanding stock under a plan of complete
or partial liquidation.' Thus, a heavy double taxation may result from
a sale of corporate assets. To avoid this, and so reduce taxes, several
methods for the transfer of the selling corporation's assets have been
devised.
One such possible method is to have the corporation liquidate and,
upon liquidation, distribute its assets in kind to its stockholders in retirement of the outstanding stock. The stockholders may then sell the
assets to the buyer. By the terms of U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.22(a)20 (1943), distribution in kind of assets on liquidation of a corporation
is not subject to a capital gains tax. Thus, here, the only tax on the
entire transaction is that levied upon the proceeds of the sale of the
assets by the stockholders. By using this method the buyer gets only
the desired assets of the corporation, free of its unwanted liabilities. It
would seem desirable then to use this method of transfering the assets.
However, in Court Holding Co. v. Commissioner,2 perhaps the most
widely recognized case interpreting U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.22(a)20 (1943), the United States Supreme Court held that mere formal
steps of liquidation and sale by the stockholders would not be permitted
to -disguise what was in substance a sale by the corporation. In that
case, the petitioner, Court Holding Co., was a corporation formed to
hold an apartment house as its only asset. The apartment house was
leased and the lessees, after approximately one year's occupancy, stated
their desire to purchase the property. Thereupon the two stockholders
of petitioner, who were also two of the three directors, began negotiations
and terms were eventually agreed upon, satisfactory both to the lessees
and to the stockholders and directors of petitioner. The directors of
petitioner, however, refused to execute the contract of sale because a
heavy capital gains tax would result. On the same day, the directors
voted to liquidate and distribute the assets in kind to the stockholders
in return for all the outstanding stock. This being done, the stockholders, three days later, sold the apartment to the lessees, using the
same terms previously agreed upon between the lessees and the directors. Though all the steps required by the regulation were carried
out, the Court held that petitioner corporation was subject to a capital
gains tax on the sale, with the result that the double tax was imposed.
The Court reasoned that since the corporation had done all the negotiating and had agreed upon terms which the stockholders only carried
out, the stockholders were mere conduits for a sale which in substance
was one by the corporation.
From this decision it appeared that U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.22
'INT. REv. CODE §115(c); Adams, Some Tax Aspects of the Complete and
Partial Liquidation of Corporations,28 N. C. L. REv. 36 (1949).
2324 U. S. 331 (1945).
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(a)-20 (1943) would not exempt a liquidation from the capital gains
tax if such liquidation were made for the sole purpose of consummating
a sale of the corporation's assets and avoiding a tax to the corporation.
This principle is in line with the Court's policy of looking through a
transaction to discover the substance and taxing it accordingly.3
Recently, however, United States v. Cumberlaizd Public Service
Co.,4 a case involving the same regulation, was before the Court and it
was there held that the corporation was not subject to the capital gains
tax. There a closely held corporation was engaged in generating and
distributing electric power, but the stockholders and directors, realizing
the inability to compete with companies supplied with T.V.A. power,
had offered to sell all-the outstanding stock to an electric power cooperative using T.V.A. power. The cooperative refused to purchase the stock
but offered to purchase certain of petitioner's assets. Petitioner rejected
this offer due to the heavy capital gains tax involved in such a sale.
Petitioner then called in an accountant to discuss a possible transfer of
the assets which would avoid the double taxation. It was then decided
that the petitioner should liquidate and distribute the assets to the stockholders who in turn would sell them to the cooperative.
These steps were carried out and the commissioner, relying upon
the Court Holding Co. case, imposed a capital gains tax upon the petitioner. The Court of Claims, however, rejected the commissioner's
claim,5 reasoning that since the negotiations were started by the stockholders as such, rather than by the corporation, the Court Holding Co.
rule should not apply. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Though it refused to overrule the Court Holding Co. case, how effective
is the distinction made? Does not the Cumberland case rob the Court
Holding Co. decision of its desired effect and underlying principle?
It is true that in the Cumberland case the stockholders acted as such,
and not as the directors of the corporation, in carrying on the negotiations. But this distinction leads to the conclusion that the future decisions will be made to rest, in part at least, upon whether the directors,
being cognizant of the tax problems involved, preface their negotiations
for sale by an indication that they are acting as stockholders, or whether,
being unaware of the tax problems, they act as directors and officers
of the corporation. In a closely held corporation having only two or
three stockholders, it is often difficult to determine whether it is the
corporation or the stockholders who are negotiating. That the corpora'Weiss v. Steam, 265 U. S. 242 (1924) ; United States v. Phellis, 257 U. S.
156 (1921) ; Muerer Steel Barrel Co. v. Commissioner, 144 F. 2d 282 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 324 U. S. 860 rehearing denied, 325 U. S. 892 (1944) (Court construed the same regulation section as did the Court in Court Holding Co. v. Commissioner) ; Commissioner v. Ashland Oil & Refining Co., 99 F. 2d 588 (6th Cir.),

cert. denied, 306 U. S. 661 (1938).
'338 U. S. 451 (1950).

'83 F. Supp. 843 (Ct. Cl. 1949).
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tion owns the property during the negotiations is not decisive, since it
has been held that a stockholder may negotiate and contract to sell property which he expects to receive by liquidation, though title to it is still
in the corporation. 6 Thus, it cannot be said that the stockholder is
presumed to be negotiating for the corporation simply because the title
remains in the corporation and the stockholder who is negotiating is
also a director of the corporation. This is true though no liquidation
plan has yet been formulated. 7 On the other hand, the fact that the
liquidation plan has been enacted by the directors prior to the negotiations for sale is not sufficient to enable courts to hold that the negotiations are being carried on by the stockholders, even though it might be
said that the stockholders obtained equitable title to the assets by the
enactment of the liquidation plan.s
In the Court Holding Co. case there was no binding contract entered
into by the corporation before the liquidation. For this reason it seems
that the Court might have held that adoption of the previous terms and
execution of a written contract by the stockholders was sufficient to hold
that the sale was one by the stockholders. They had the power to reject
the previous terms and negotiate anew. They chose, however, not to
exercise such power but rather to accept the terms already agreed upon.
In the field of taxation a power is frequently decisive, even though not
exercised, 9 and so it might have been here. Rather, the Court held the
point immaterial and of no effect.
In the Cuinberland case the Court said: "but congress has imposed
no tax on liquidating distributions in kind or on dissolution, whatever
may be the motive for such liquidation. Consequently, a corporation
may liquidate or dissolve without subjecting itself to the corporate gains
tax, even through a primary motive is to avoid the burden of corporate
taxation."' 1 There is nothing unusual about this statement. It is a long
"Howell Turpentine Co. v. Commissioner, 162 F. 2d 319 (5th Cir. 1947);

United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co., 83 F. Supp. 843 (Ct. Cl. 1949).

But cf. Kaufman v. Commissioner, 175 F. 2d 28 (3d Cir. 1949) (court held that
since stockholders were also directors, they were under a legal duty to act as
directors when dealing with corporate property; hence, they cannot, as stockholders, negotiate regarding corporate property before liquidation) ; Trippett v.
Commissioner, 118 F. 2d 764 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 644 (1941).
Howell Turpentine Co. v. Commissioner, 162 F. 2d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1947).
1 Borall Corp. v. Commissioner, 167 F. 2d 865 (2d Cir. 1948) (Directors resolved: (1) that the corporation distribute its assets to the stockholders, (2) that
the assets be actually delivered to the stockholders or sold by an agent selected
for them. Part of the assets, at the stockholder's election, the corporation turned
over to a bank to sell for the stockholders and distribute the proceeds to them.
Held: since the bank was selected by the corporation, the bank was a liquidation
trustee of the corporation and sale was one by the corporation and not by the
stockholders.).
Helvering v.Clifford, 309 U. S.331 (1940) (setting up the so-called Clifford
doctrine, holding that certain powers, when retained in a trust by the settlor, make
the income taxable to the settlor even though the powers are not exercised)
F. 2d 916 (1st Cir. 1940).
Commissioner,
Fulham
(1950).
Ct. 280, 282 110
Sup.
3070 v.
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established principle. 1 ' But, how can it be reconciled with the Court
Holding Co. decision? A distinction is sometimes made between a
transaction which serves a legitimate business purpose and one which
is merely a cover for what is, in substance, an entirely different type of
transaction. 12 Since in both the Court Holding Co. and Cumberland
cases the business purpose behind the transactions was the sale of the
assets to the buyer, it hardly seems that the liquidation in the one instance was more bona fide than in the other.
It seems that the mere form of the negotiations, and not the substance behind the transactions, is to be the deciding factor in cases of
this type. We are left with a rigid set of facts on the one hand under
which the tax may be reduced successfully, while on the other hand we
have another set of facts which fails to accomplish this result. This is
not surprising in view of the importance of minute procedural steps in
the field of taxation.
This presents the problem of where, relative to the two sets of facts,
the Court will draw the line between corporate and stockholder action.
In the Court Holding Co. case the Court relied heavily upon the fact
that the terms of the sale were exactly those reached in the negotiations
between the directors and the lessees. Perhaps the result would have
been different had the corporate negotiations left unsettled a material
point which the stockholders later settled. On the other hand, the Court
might have held that the sale was in effect one by the corporation, since
a majority of the negotiations had been completed before the liquidation.
In a more recent lower court case, 13 the negotiations were begun by
the president but were shortly assumed and completed by the stockholders, who made it plain from the beginning that an individual sale
by the stockholders and. not a corporate sale was contemplated. The
court of appeals there held that since title was in the corporation during
negotiations and since no liquidation steps were taken prior to starting
negotiations, the stockholders were acting for the corporation. The
result was that the sale by the stockholders following liquidation was
held to be a corporate sale. Under the Cumberland rule it seems that
this holding would be reversed by the Supreme Court, if brought before
"' Motive of avoidance is immaterial if the means is legal. Commissioner v.
Tower, 327 U. S. 280 (1945) ; Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465 (1935). But
cf. Commissioner v. Phipps, 336 U. S. 410 (1948) (In interpreting and approving

the theory behind Commissioner v. Sansome, 60 F. 2d 937 (1932), the Court here

says that a tax may be upheld solely on grounds of preventing tax avoidance. This
looks like a statement of what has been the actual practice, though a contrary rule
has been stated.).
"2Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465 (1935) ; Chisholm v. Commissioner, 79
F. 2d 14 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 296 U. S. 641 (1935) (the purpose which counts
is the one which defeats or contradicts the apparent transaction, not the purpose
to escape taxation which the apparent, but not the whole, transaction would
realize).
13 Kaufman v. Commissioner, 175 F. 2d 28 (3d Cir. 1949).
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it, but we must wait for the ruling on each set of facts as it is presented.
It is suggested, on the basis of present decisions, that in carrying
out the liquidation and sale by the stockholders, the liquidation should
be effected, if at all possible, before any definitive negotiating takes place.
It should be done as soon as the idea to sell is conceived in order to
prevent a holding that any part of the negotiations was corporate action.
If the negotiations do take place before liquidation, they should be carried on in behalf of the stockholders by someone who is not an officer
of the corporation. 14 When the assets are transferred to an agent for
the stockholders, care should be taken that the corporation or the board
of directors, as a body, has no hand in the appointment of such agent,
but rather that a stockholder's petition or consent should be obtained
appointing him.' 5
There should be a complete vesting of title to the assets in the stockholders before the sale takes place. It has been held that payment of a
corporate debt out of the proceeds of the sale by the stockholders does
not make the sale one by the corporation.' 0 It is best, however, to avoid
this since it is possible that courts may say that the sale was for the
corporation's benefit and hence was corporate action. The rule which
permits escape from double taxation in this situation is a just one but
great care must be exercised to reap its benefits.
VICTOR S. BRYANT, JR.
Federal Jurisdiction-Amount in ControversyEffect of Counterclaim
Under Rule 13 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure counterclaims are divided into two classes, compulsory and permissive. A compulsory counterclaim is one which must be pleaded if it arises out of
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing
party's claim, does not require the presence of parties over whom the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and is not the subject matter of a
pending action.' A permissive counterclaim is any other claim against
an opposing party.2
"Louisville Trust Co. v. Glenn, 65 F. Supp. 193 (W. D. Ky. 1946) (three
man committee appointed by stockholders; only one member of committee was
officer of corporation; liquidation resolution but no actual liquidation occurred
before negotiations began).
" Borall Corp. v. Commissioner, 167 F. 2d 865 (2d Cir. 1948); Louisville
Trust Co. v. Glenn, 65 F. Supp. 193 (W. D. Ky. 1946); Burnet v. Lexington Ice
& Coal Co., 62 F. 2d 906 (4th Cir. 1933) (North Carolina federal case using what
is now N. C. GEN. STAT. §55-132 (1943) which provides that corporation is still
entity for winding up purposes for three years after dissolution, and holding that
even after dissolution, agent appointed by corporation for stockholders actually
corporation's trustee in liquidation and sale by him corporate sale).
" Louisville Trust Co. v. Glenn, 65 F. Supp. 193 (W. D. Ky. 1946).
1

Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a).

'Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 (b).
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Where jurisdiction of a district court is based on a general federal
question, that is, where there is no special provision in an act being to
the contrary, there is an additional requirement that the amount in
controversy exceed $3,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 3 Where
jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship, again the amount in
4
controversy must exceed $3,000, exclusive of interests and costs.

Where a counterclaim is of the compulsory type, there seems to be
no question that when the jurisdictional elements are present as to the
plaintiff's claim, 5 the counterclaim is regarded as ancillary or auxiliary, 6
and the court will decide the counterclaim even though the opposing
claim is denied on the merits.1 However, if the court has no jurisdiction
over the main transaction, even a compulsory counterclaim will be dismissed unless it has independent federal jurisdictional grounds.8
Where a counterclaim is of the permissive type, there must be independent grounds of federal jurisdiction or the counterclaim will be
dismissed. 9 It has been said that in the case of a set-off, which is defined as a demand asserted to diminish or extinguish plaintiff's demand,
which arises out of a transaction different from that sued on, and which
must be liquidated and emerge from a contract or judgment, no independent grounds or federal jurisdiction are necessary. 10
Aggregating the claims of both the plaintiff and defendant in order
to make up the amount in controversy presents a more difficult question.
In looking at this group of cases it is convenient to break the cases down
into (1) cases originating in federal courts, and (2) removal cases.
In cases originating in federal courts and where the defendant's
'28 U. S. C. §1331 (1948).
'28 U. S. C. §1332 (1948).
'When a defendant files a claim against a third party who is brought in as a

defendant to this claim, the original defendant becomes a third party plaintiff, and
the third party is denominated a third party defendant. If the third party defendant
files a claim against the third party plaintiff, this claim is a counterclaim, and not
a cross-claim. 3 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcrIcE 13.06 (2d ed. 1948).
'Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U. S. 593 (1926) (decided under
old Federal Equity Rule 30); United States, to Use and for Benefit of Foster
Wheeler Corp. v. American Surety Co., 142 F. 2d 726 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Norton v.
Agricultural Bond & Credit Corp., 92 F. 2d 348 (10th Cir. 1937) ; New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Kaufman, 78 F. 2d 398 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 626
(1935).
Kirby v. American Soda Fountain Co., 194 U. S. 141 (1904) ; Home Ins. Co.
v. Trotter, 130 F. 2d 800 (8th Cir. 1942) ; Horwitz v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
80 F. 2d 295 (9th Cir. 1935).
' Goldstone v. Payne, 94 F. 2d 855 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U. S. 585 (1938).
'Robinson Bros. v. Tygart Steel Products Co., 9 F. R. D. 468 (W. D. Pa.
1949); Jewish Consumptives Relief Society v. Rothfield, 9 F. R. D. 64 (S. D.
N. Y. 1949); Cusimano v. Falciglia, 6 F. R. D. 586 (S. D. N. Y. 1947); Marks
v. Spitz, 4 F. R. D. 348 (D. Mass. 1945) ; Donnelly Garment Co. v. Int'l Ladies
Garment Workers Union, 47 F. Supp. 67 (W. D. Mo. 1942). See Kantar v.
Garchell, 150 F. 2d 47, 49 (8th Cir. 1945) where the report does not state whether
or not the counterclaim was raised on appeal, and so may be dictum.
103 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
13.19 (2d ed. 1948). A dictum in Marks v.
Spitz, 4 F. R. D. 348 (D. Mass. 1945) supports this proposition, but Robinson
Bros. v. Tygart Steel Products Co., 9 F. R. D. 468 (W. D. Pa. 1949) is contra.
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counterclaim is itself in excess of the jurisdictional amount, the meager
authority on the point indicates that the federal court has jurisdiction
of the entire suit, regardless of plaintiff's claim. Roberts Mining and
Milling Co. v. Schrader" holds squarely that this is so. Dicta in
American Sheet and Tin Plate Co. v. Winzeler,12 Central Commercial
Co. v. Jones-Dusenbury Co.,'5 Ginsburg v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co.,14 and an implication in 0. J. Lewis Mercantile Co. v. Klepner'1 also support the view that jurisdiction exists.
Where the defendant's counterclaim is not in excess of $3,000, exclusive of interest and costs, but when added to the plaintiff's claim,
the total exceeds the minimum jurisdictional amount, the courts again
state that this should be allowed, but all of these statements can be classified as dicta. These dicta may be found in Kirby v. American Soda
Fountain Co.,' 6 Central Commercial Co. v. Jones-Dusenbury Co., and
American Sheet and Tin Plate Ca. v. Winzeler. Honw Life Insurance
Co. v. Sipp'7 is a case in point, usually cited as contra, but the peculiar
8
fact situation of that case coupled with language which the court used1
would seem to be more of a recognition of the rule, with an exception
being made. In Lee v. Continental Insurance Co.19 there was a square
holding that the amount of the counterclaim could be added to the claim
of the plaintiff to make up the jurisdictional amount. This case originated in "a court of Utah territory" and was removed to the federal circuit court when Utah was admitted as a state.
In certain types of removal cases the effect of a counterclaim is
quite clear. Although before 1941 there was a sharp and irreconcilable
21
split of authority on the point, 20 Shamrock Oil and Gas Corp. v. Sheets
settled the proposition that if a non-resident plaintiff sued in a state
court, for whatever amount, and defendant pleaded a counterclaim in
excess of the jurisdictional amount, the plaintiff could not remove, be"95 F. 2d 522 (9th Cir. 1938).
u227 Fed. 321, 324 (N. D. Ohio 1915).
'3251 Fed. 13, 19 (7th Cir. 1918).
1, 69 F. 2d 97, 98 (2d Cir. 1934).
"See 176 Fed. 343, 346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 216 U. S. 620 (1909), where
the court said that the defendant invoked the jurisdiction of the court for its own
benefit by putting in a counterclaim, and was estopped to deny jurisdiction. This
case has ,been criticized for its holding by Judge Dobie in an article, Jurisdictional
Amount in the United States District Court, 38 HARv. L. Ray. 733 (1925), and
by the court in Home Life Ins. Co. v. Sipp, 11 F. 2d 474 (3d Cir. 1926), on the
grounds that the cases cited to sustain the holding will not do so.
10194 U. S. 141, 144 (1904).
" 11 F. 2d 474 (3d Cir. 1926).
18 "The counterclaim in this case--$423--is not in itself equal to the jurisdictional amount; nor when added to the plaintiff's demand [an even $3,000] does it
raise the total to the amount the statute requires, for the reason that the counterclaim was pleaded not to recover anything from the plaintiff but merely to be
deducted from any amount that might be found due the plaintiff, and particularly
to be deducted from an amount which the defendant admits it owes."
1274 Fed. 424 (C. C. D. Utah 1896).
2o For a collection of cases see 28 U. S. C. A. §71, n. 668 (1926).
21313 U. S. 100 (1941).
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cause he was not a defendant within the meaning of the removal statutes.
It is equally clear that the defendant being sued in his home state
cannot remove, because the statute explicitly limits the right of removal
to a nonresident defendant or defendants. 22 By the weight of authority
a non-resident defendant who pleads a counterclaim in a state court in
excess of the jurisdictional amount cannot remove when the plaintiff
claims only $3,000 or less. The courts take the view that it is the demand
in the complaint which fixes the amount in controversy, and a counter23
claim is not to be considered.
When both original and removal suits are considered, the decisions
do not warrant the statements frequently made by writers that it is
generally held that a counterclaim can be used to make up the jurisdictional amount. 24 Most of the decisions cited as permitting such a
25
proposition are only dicta.
In conclusion this writer suggests that the existing practice of deciding compulsory counterclaims when there is jurisdiction over the
plaintiff's complaint, regardless of the amount of the counterclaim,
should be maintained. In addition the effect of a counterclaim upon
the jurisdictional amount should be made clear by an amendment to
Rule 13 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The simplest rule,
and one which would be in line with the plaintiff's viewpoint theory, as
well as the policy of restricting federal jurisdiction, would be a requirement that plaintiff's complaint show that an amount exceeding $3,000
exclusive of interest and costs, be in controversy, and no counterclaim
would be considered to make up that amount. No distinction should
be made between original and removal jurisdiction.
BASIL SHERRILL.

Federal Jurisdiction-Amount in Controversy-Unregistered
Trade-marks and Trade Names
Where the owner of a trade-mark has registered it pursuant to the
Federal Trade-Mark statutes, no jurisdictional amount is required in
an action for infringement in the federal courts.1 In addition, where a
=228 U. S. C. §1441 (b) (1948).
"' Gates v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 56 F. Supp. 149 (E. D. N. Y. 1944);
Haney v. Wilcheck, 38 F. Supp. 345 (W. D. Va. 1941) ; Harley v. Firemen's Fund
Ins. Co., 245 Fed. 471 (W. D. Wash. 1913) ; Bennett v. Devine, 45 Fed. 705 (C. C.
S. D. Iowa 1891); La Montagne v. T. W. Harvey Lumber Co., 44 Fed. 645
(C. C. E. D. Wis. 1891). Contra: Wheatley v. Martin, 62 F. Supp. 109 (W. D.
Ark. 1945) ; Clarkson v. Manson, 4 Fed. 257 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1880). Mackay
v. Uinta Development Co., 229 U. S. 173 (1913) senmble.
SSIMIINs, FEDERAL PRAcTicE §132 (3d ed. 1938); MONTGOMERY'S MANUAL OF
FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROcEDURE §94 (4th ed. 1942) ; Shulman and Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional Limitations on Federal Procedure, 45 YALE L. J. 393
(1936).
"'Note, 25 MINN. L. Rav. 356 (1941).

28.U. S. C. §1338(a) (1948).
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claim for unfair competition is joined with a substantial and related
claim of infringement, federal courts will accept and retain jurisdiction
of the former irrespective of the amount in controvery2 even though the
latter claim fails. 3 Where, however, the action is not bottomed on a
federally registered mark, federal courts have jurisdiction only where
the amount in controversy exceeds $3,000 exclusive of- interest and
costs. 4 This note deals with the manner in which federal courts determine the requisite amount in actions to enjoin as infringement and unfair competition the use of an unregistered trade-mark or trade name.
The courts have employed two different but related tests for measuring the amount in controvery. Under one test the measure is the entire value of the trade-mark, trade name, or good will wherever found.
Under the other test, jurisdictional amount is not measured by the entire
value of the mark, name, or good will, but only by the injury to that
value, both present and prospective.
In all the cases where the "entire value" test has been adopted, the
courts have found the requisite jurisdictional amount.6 The fact situations involved were not confined to any one type of unfair use but in228 U. S. C. §1338(b) (1948). Cf. Del Monte Special Food Co. v. California
Packing Corp., 34 F. 2d 774 (9th Cir. 1929).
'Hum v. Oursler, 289 U. S. 238 (1933) ; Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works
v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U. S. 315 (1938). For an analysis of this doctrine and

a collection of cases, see 2

CALLaMANN, UNFAIR COMPErTITION AND TRADE-MARKS

1556-1572 (1945) and 2 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACricE 368-377 (1948).
'28 U. S. C. §1332(a) (1948).
'Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. v. Kline, 132 F. 2d 520 (8th Cir. 1942)
(value of good will) ; Indian Territory Oil & Gas Co. v. Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co., 95 F. 2d 711 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U. S. 607 (1938) (value
of the business or right to be protected; good will is an intangible asset to be considered in ascertaining the value of the business or right); Harvey v. American
Coal Co., 50 F. 2d 832 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 669 (1931) (value of
trade name or good will) ; Wisconsin Electric Co. v. Dumore Co., 35 F. 2d 555
(6th Cir. 1929), cert. granted, 281 U. S. 710 (1930), cert. dismissed, 282 U. S.
813 (1931) (value of word as applicable to plaintiff's business) ; Del Monte Special
Food Co. v. California Packing Corp., 34 F. 2d 774 (9th Cir. 1929) (value of good
will); Ury v. Mazer Cigar Mfg. Co., 253 Fed. 551 (8th Cir. 1918) (value of
property right); General Shoe Corp. v. Rosen, 29 F. Supp. 102 (S. D. W. Va.
1939), rev'd on other grounds, 111 F. 2d 95 (4th Cir. 1940) (value of good will
and business) ; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. A. & P. Radio Stores, 20 F.
Supp. 703 (E. D. Pa. 1937) (value of trade-mark and good will); Household
Finance Corp. of Delaware v. Household Finance Corp. of West Virginia, 11 F.
Supp. 3 (N. D. W. Va. 1935) (value of good will); Hennessy v. Harrmann, 89
Fed. 669 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1898) (value of trade-mark) ; Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co. v. A. & P. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 450 (W. D. Pa. 1934)
semble; cf. Coca-Cola Co. v. Brown & Allen, 274 Fed. 481 (N. D. Ga. 1921)
(The alleged unfair use differs from the other cases under consideration. Here
the defendant was diluting plaintiff's syrup before mixing fountain Coca-Colas.) ;
see Hanson v. Triangle Publications, Inc. 163 F. 2d 74, 79 (8th Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 332 U. S. 855 (1948) (value of good will); Adam Hat Stores, Inc. v.
Scherper, 45 F. Supp. 804, 807 (E. D. Wis. 1942) (value of good will) ; American
Viscose Corp. v. Crown Craft, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 884, 885 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) (value
of good will) ; Eternit, Inc. v. J. J. Clarke Co., 18 F. 2d 607, 609 (E. D. La. 1927)
(value of trade-mark).
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cluded palming off of product,0 confusion of source of product 7 or service, 8 confusion of ownership of the business, 9 and confusion of spon-

sorship. 10 The test has been applied where the products were in direct
competition for a substantial market in the same area, 11 but in Ury v.
Maaer Cigar Manufacturing Co., 12 plaintiff of Detroit had only one
customer in St. Louis where -defendant's cigars were sold. And in
Household Finance Co. of Delaware v. Household Finrnce Co. of West
Virginia,13 plaintiff not only was not doing business in defendant's area
of operation and had not even qualified to do business in that state,
but also there was no evidence offered of an intention ever to do business
there. There was neither evidence of the volume and extent of defendant's business nor evidence of any probability of expansion. Since,
however, plaintiff had advertised in local and national periodicals and
maintained offices sixty miles away in a bordering state, the court found
confusion and the "entire value" test was applied. 14 There are other
cases where the parties were producing non-competing products but
Hennessy v. Harrmann, 89 Fed. 669 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1898) (defendant sold
counterfeit labels to others who palmed off their brandy as plaintiff's).
'Wisconsin Electric Co. v. Dumore Co., 35 F. 2d 555 (6th Cir. 1929), cert.
granted, 281 U. S. 710 (1930), cert. dismissed, 282 U. S. 813 (1931) ; Del Monte
Special Food Co. v. California Packing Corp., 34 F. 2d 774 (9th Cir. 1929).
8 Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. v. Kline, 132 F. 2d 520 (8th Cir. 1942);
Household Finance Corp. of Delaware v. Household Finance Corp. of West Virginia, 11 F. Supp. 3 (N. D. W. Va. 1935).
' Indian Territory Oil & Gas Co. v. Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co., 95
F. 2d 711 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U. S. 607 (1938) ; Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co. v. A. & P. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 450 (W. D. Pa. 1934).
10 Hanson v. Triangle Publications,
Inc., 163 F. 2d 74 (8th Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 332 U. S. 855 (1948).
" Harvey v. American Coal Co., 50 F. 2d 832 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U. S.
669 (1931).
1 253 Fed. 551 (8th Cir. 1918).
There was however an accounting of $346
which indicates that defendant's volume of sales was substantial.
11 F. Supp. 3 (N. D. W. Va. 1935).
14 The court pointed out that the injury to be guarded against was
(1) to the
public by palming off and (2) to the plaintiff by diverting trade. While there was
confusion, in the absence of inferior service and business practices by defendant it
is doubtful whether the public would actually be injured. [But injury to the public
is not confined to a situation where the purchaser obtains an inferior product or
service. There is prejudice to the public when the product or service it receives is
different from that which it thought it was buying. See Federal Trade Commission v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U. S. 67 (1934).] And in view of the areas of
operations of the parties it is questionable whether there was or would be a substantial amount of trade diverted. The court probably was greatly impressed by
the fact that defendant, after eight years of operation under one name, changed its
name to the exact name of plaintiff for the rather obvious purpose of obtaining an
unfair benefit from plaintiff's advertising and good will. In this connection, see
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. v. Kline, 132 F. 2d 520 (8th Cir. 1942), where
plaintiff's subsidiaries had operated under the name "Personal Finance Co." in
four different localities in Iowa for several years prior to liquidation and withdrawal in 1934. In 1940 a subsidiary re-entered Iowa. The next year defendant
began operating under the same name as plaintiff's subsidiaries in a city where
one of the subsidiaries had formerly operated. The circuit court of appeals stated
that confusion would arise, the public would be deceived, and that defendant would
reap where it had not sown.
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nevertheless, there existed a probability of deception because plaintiff
was carrying on a substantial amount of business in the defendant's area
of operation and, while defendant was not yet doing a large volume of
business, there were indications of expansion of volume and area by
defendant. 15 ' In one case the court referred to the value of plaintiff's
good will and advertising, not merely of the trade-mark in question but
also of two other trade-marks which plaintiff was using or had used on
its product.' 6
The second test used in the injunction cases restricts the amount in
controversy to the injury, both present and prospective, to the value of
the trade-mark, trade name, or good will. 17 Of the cases adopting this
test, the strongest opinion is that of Judge Clark in Pure Oil Co. v.
Puritan Oil Co.18 There the plaintiff brought action for damages, an
accounting, and injunction against infringement of trade-marks and
unfair competition, but on trial renounced the prayer for damages and
an accounting. Plaintiff sold gasoline and other petroleum products
through filling stations in twenty-five states. Defendant operated a
single unprofitable filling station in Hartford, Connecticut, under the
name "Puritan" and sold oil and grease under the trade-marks of their
producers and gasoline under the trade-mark "Pure." At least 95%
of defendant's gasoline sales were to local residents. The plaintiff formerly had stations in Connecticut but had withdrawn them, and at the
time of suit its only sales were of oils and grease for industrial use.
Judge Clark squarely faced and rejected the contention that jurisdiction
was to be measured by the entire value of plaintiff's good will.' 0 In
" Wisconsin Electric Co. v. Dumore Co., 35 F. 2d 555 (6th Cir. 1929), cert.
granted,281 U. S. 710 (1930), cert. dismissed, 282 U. S. 813 (1931); Del Monte
Special Food Co. v. California Packing Corp., 34 F. 2d 774 (9th Cir. 1929). In
these two cases the products were of a kind which reach a large number of people.
General Shoe Corp. v. Rosen, 29 F. Supp. 102 (S. D. W. Va. 1939), rez"d
on other grounds, 111 F. 2d 95 (4th Cir. 1940).
" Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Food Fair, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 445 (D. Mass. 1948),
aff'd, 177 F. 2d 177 (1st Cir. 1949) ; Pure Oil Co. v. Puritan Oil Co., 39 F. Supp.
68 (D. Conn. 1941), rev'd on other grounds, 127 F. 2d 6 (2d Cir. 1942) ; Draper
v. Skerrett, 116 Fed. 206 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1902); Winchester Repeating Arms Co.
v. Butler Bros., 128 Fed. 976 (N. D. Ill. 1904); Symonds v. Greene, 28 Fed. 834
(C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1886) (value of the injunction); Stork Restaurant, Inc. v.
Marcus, 36 F. Supp. 90 (E. D. Pa. 1941) sevible; see Moline Plow Co. v. Omaha
Iron Store Co., 235 Fed. 519, 525 (8th Cir. 1916), cert. denied, 242 U. S. 649, appeal dismissed, sub. norn., Omaha Baum Iron Store Co. v. Moline Plow Co., 244
U. S.650 (1917).
"839 F. Supp. 68 (D. Conn. 1941). The trade-marks were registered, but the
district court held that it did not acquire jurisdiction under the Federal Act because there was no use by defendant in interstate commerce and that the court could
not retain jurisdiction under the Hum rule because there was no subsantial claim
that defendant's use was in interstate commerce. The circuit court of appeals
reversed on a finding of substantial claim. 127 F. 2d 6 (2d Cir. 1942).
19 There are three distinct factors involved in these cases: (1) amount of injury
to date (2) future injury (3) entire value of the trade-mark, trade name, or good
will. The courts adopting the "entire value" of the good will test state the amount
in controversy is not limited to (1) but is or includes (3). With apparently two
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applying the injury test and finding a lack of jurisdictional amount, he
emphasized that practically all of defendant's small volume of gasoline
sales were to local residents; that there was no probability of expansion
since defendant was operating at a loss; that there was no evidence of
inferior service; and that plaintiff no longer sold its products through
filling stations in Connecticut and offered no evidence of an intention to
-do so in the future.
20
The most recent decision on this question was the Food Fair case.
Defendant was operating a supermarket in Brookline, Massachusetts.
Plaintiff's action was based on a Massachusetts statute which provided
that injunction would lie for "likelihood of injury to business reputation
or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a trade-mark or trade name
... notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or
of confusion as to source of goods or service."'21 The trial court adopted
the injury test as stated in the Pure Oil case but unlike Judge Clark
found jurisdictional amount involved. A comparison of these two cases
indicates the chief difference to be that in Pure Oil plaintiff had withdrawn from Connecticut and offered no evidence of re-expanding;
whereas, in Food Fairplaintiff's business was expanding and there was
a probability that it was planning to commence business in Massachusetts. Without attempting to evaluate the injury that was or would be
the result from dilution of the trade name, the district court held the
value of plaintiff's "right to operate supermarkets in Massachusetts
under the name Food Fair without being faced with a competitor in
Brookline who has the same name and who probably would seek to
enjoin plaintiff's expansion" exceeded $3,000.22

In computing jurisdictional amount in actions to enjoin as infringement and unfair competition the use of an unregistered trade-mark or
exceptions, Miles Laboratories,Inc. v. Seignious and Caron Corp. v. Wolf Drug
Co., both cited infra note 22, the courts make no specific mention of factor (2) in
stating the test. Therefore, in a sense the courts adopting the "entire value" test
do not squarely reject the "injury test."
Courts adopting the "entire value" of the good will test did not decide whether
or not jurisdictional amount would be present had they applied only the "injury"
to good will test. An analysis of these cases indicates that the requisite jurisdictional amount probably would not have been present in some instances had the
latter test been applied.
" Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Food Fair, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 445 (D. Mass. 1948),
aff'd, 177 F. 2d 177 (1st Cir. 1949).
1 Acts, 1947, c.307, §7A.
"Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Food Fair, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 445, 452 (D. Mass.
1948), aff'd, 177 F. 2d 177 (lst Cir. 1949).
In Fair Trade actions to enjoin sales below the standard price established by
the producer, the courts have stated that price standardization is primarily effected
to protect good will. Most of the cases measure jurisdictional amount by the
entire value of the good will in a particular state. Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Seignious, 30 F. Supp. 549 (E. D. S. C. 1939) ; Calvert Distilling Co. v. Brandon, 24
F. Supp. 857 (W. D. S. C. 1938); Caron Corp. v. Wolf Drug Co., 40 F. Supp.
103 (D. N. J. 1941). Contra: James Heddronfs Sons v. Callender, 28 F. Supp.
643 (D. Minn. 1939).
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trade name, it appears that the better test is the injury to the value of
the trade-mark, trade name, or good will.23

Numerous factors present

themselves for consideration under this test. Among the more important factors are the extent of plaintiff's business and/or good will
in defendant's area of influence, the character of both businesses and
the class and number of people they serve, and whether either business
is expanding or contracting in volume, area, or scope of use. Such
factors are important whether injury be to the public by palming off
or to the plaintiff by diverting trade, injuring good will by inferior
product or service, or diluting the distinctive quality of the mark. In
applying this test and evaluating the injury, the court should not restrict
itself to arbitrary geographical boundaries but should look to the area
of defendant's influence wherever its bounds may be.
It is the view of some writers that the Lanham Trade-Mark Act 2 4
provides for a substantive federal law of trade-marks and unfair competition.2 5 Diggins interprets the Act as "national legislation along
national lines" designed to provide uniformity in place of conflict and
confusion. His view is that if the action "involves commerce which
may lawfully be regulated by Congress" then it "arises under" the Act;
and if it "arises under" the Act then the federal courts have original
jurisdiction irrespective of registration. If this view is adopted by the
courts, the conflict as to the proper method of calculating jurisdictional
amount will be eliminated. Such interpretation of the Lanham Act has
not yet been adopted by the courts and it is doubtful that it will be. In
the absence of such interpretation of the Act by the courts, the lack of
registration will continue to raise the problem of the amount in controversy.26
JosEPli K. BYRD.
2 There are exceptional cases where defendant's acts threaten to destroy the
good will in a definite geographical area. In such case the value of the injury
will be the entire value of the good will in that area. An interesting example of
this is Scalise v. National Utility Service, Inc., 120 F. 2d 938 (5th Cir. 1941),
where defendant fraudulently obtained a permit to do business in Florida under
plaintiff's name thus preventing plaintiff from obtaining a permit to do business
in that state under its own name.
2"60 State. 427 (1946), 15 U. S. C. §1051 (1948).
" See RoBERT, THE NEW TRADE-MARK MANUAL 167-180 (1947); Diggins,
Federal and State Regulation of Trade-narks, 14 LAw & CoNTEmP. PROD. 200
(1949). See also Bunn, The National Law of Unfair Competition, 62 HAR. L.
REv. 987 (1949), where the author concluded that even before the Lanham Act
Congress had provided for a national law of unfair competition in the Federal
Trade Commission Act.
"0Due to the expanded scope of marks and names registrable under the Lanham
Act, the problem of jurisdictional amount may become less important. However,
the anticipated rush to register theretofore unregistrable marks has not yet materialized.
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Insurance-Liability-Injured Third Party in Action
Against Insurer for Intentional Injuries
As a general rule, in the absence of statute, a liability insurance
policy by its terms does not cover the claims of a third party arising by
reason of assured's intentional' misconduct. 2 Most policies expressly
exclude such coverage; and even when there is no contractual provision,
courts ordinarily imply an exclusion of such liability.3 Despite the
existence of these contractual limitations, courts rarely invoke them to
bar recovery by a third party against the liability insurer. 4 An understanding of judicial treatment of these liability insurance coverage provisions is important where the attorney represents either of the adverse
parties, the willfully injured third person or the insurer.
A court faced with the problem of a third party intentionally injured
by an assured may protect the third party and find against the insurer
by following one of three principal approaches: (1) definition of certain
key words in the coverage or exclusion provisions so as to achieve the
'desired result; (2) determination that a judgment against the assured
predicated on negligence estops the insurer from subsequently asserting
that the injury was willfully inflicted; and (3) construction of statutes
1 Most courts distinguish between intentional or willful conduct and illegal
conduct. On the theory that the assured cannot reasonably have intended to pay a
premium for a "shadow" protection, courts have refused to so construe a policy
as to make the degree of protection negligible. Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liability Ins.
Co. v. Thompson, 49 F. 2d 860 (9th Cir. 1931) (drunken driving); Kautz v.
Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liability Ins. Co., 293 Pac. 133 (Cal. App. 1931) (driving
while intoxicated), rev'd on other grounds, 212 Cal. 576, 300 Pac. 34 (1931) ; Brock
v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 88 Conn. 308, 91 Atl. 279 (1914) (unlicensed minor driving) ; McMahon v. Pearlman, 242 Mass. 367, 136 N. E. 154 (1922) (expired license) ; Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Haley, 129 Miss. 525, 92 So. 635 (1922)
(speeding) ; Messersmith v. Am. Fidelity Co., 232 N. Y. 161, 133 N. E. 432 (1921)
(permitting minor to drive). See McNeely, Illegality as a Factor in Liability
Invrance, 41 CoL. L. Rav. 26 (1941).
2 Hotel Co. v. Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liability Ins. Co., 213 Ill. App. 334 (1917) ;
Miller v. United States Fidelity & Cas. Co., 291 Mass. 445, 197 N. E. 75 (1935);
Blair v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 291 Mass. 432, 197 N. E. 60 (1935) ; Sontag v. Galer,
279 Mass. 309, 181 N. E. 182 (1932) ; Baron v. Indemnity Co., 285 N. Y. Supp.
486 (1936) ; Am. Cas. Co. v. Brinsky, 51 Ohio App. 298, 200 N. E. 654 (1934);
Commonwealth Cas. Co. v. Headers, 118 Ohio St. 429, 161 N. E. 278 (1928);
County Gas Co. v. Gen. Acc. Fire and Life Assurance Corp., 56 S. W. 2d 1088
(Tex. Civ. App. 1933). Accord, Jackson v. Maryland Cas. Co., 212 N. C. 546,
193 S.E. 703 (1937).
Y. Standard Mut. Cas. Co., 110 F. 2d 1001 (7th Cir. 1940); Rothman v.
vHill
Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., 134 Ohio St. 241, 16 N. E. 2d 417 (1938) ; Sontag v.
Galer, 279 Mass. 309, 181 N. E. 182 (1932); Langford Elec. Co. v. Employers
Mut. Indemnity Corp., 210 Minn. 289, 297 N. W. 843 (1941); Messersmith v.
Am. Fidelity Co., 232 N. Y. 161, 133 N. E. 432 (1921).
'New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Jones, 135 F. 2d 191 (6th Cir. 1943). Cf.
Columbia Cas. Co. v. Abel, 171 F. 2d 215 (10th Cir. 1948) ; Sciaraffa v. Debler,
304 Mass. 240, 23 N. E. 2d 111 (1939) ; Floralbell Amusement Corp. v. Standard
Surety & Cas. Co., 9 N. Y. S. 2d 959 (1937) ; Westerland v. Argonaut Grill, 187
Wash. 437, 60 P. 2d 228 (1936) ; Archer Ballroom Co. v. Great Lakes Cas. Co.,
236 Wis. 525, 295 N. W. 702 (1941) : Fox Wisconsin Corp. v. Century Indemnity
Co., 219 Wis. 549, 263 N. W. 567 (1935).
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requiring the maintenance of liability insurance under certain circumstances as requiring that the insurance so maintained include coverage
for willfully inflicted injuries.
In determining the meaning of the phrase, "injuries arising out of
accident," in the coverage provision of liability policies, the word "accident" has been interpreted by some courts to include injuries which were
intentionally inflicted by the assured but unintentionally sustained by the
third person.5 These courts describe the injury as accidental or intententional according to whether or not the injuries could be said to be
designed or effected by the injured third person, himself.0 This line
of reasoning would, where the victim was innocent, effectually nullify
provisions excluding willful acts from the coverage of liability insurance
policies. 7 A majority of courts, however, hold that injuries are accidental or not according to the manner in which they were inflicted.8
The definition of the term "willful," the converse of "accidental," is
likewise used by some courts to enlarge the coverage of liability insurance policies. It is generally held that injuries resulting from "reckless," "wanton," or "wanton and willful" acts, without actual intent to
injure, are clearly not within the "willful" exclusion provision of the
policy." Some courts go further and hold, in cases where it appears
'New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Jones, 135 F. 2d 191 (6th Cir. 1943), affirming
45 F. Supp. 887 (E. D. Mich. 1942).
The rule is well-settled that intentional injuries may be "accidental" insofar
as recovery under ordinary accident insurance, as distinguished from liability insurance, is concerned. Employers' Indemnity Corp. v. Grant, 271 F. 136 (6th Cir.
1921) ; McCullough v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 125 Kan. 324, 264 Pac. 65 (1928) ;
Peterson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 292 Mich. 531, 290 N. W. 896 (1940). The same
rule applies in regard to recovery under workmen's compensation laws. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 171 F. 2d 723 (5th Cir. 1949).
' New Amsterdam Cas. Co.v. Jones, 135 F. 2d 191 (6th Cir. 1943); Hartford
Ace. & Indemnity Co. v. Wolbarst, 95 N. H. 40, 57 A. 2d 151 (1948); cf. E. J.
Albrecht Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 289 Ill. App. 508, 7 N. E. 2d 626 (1937);
Robinson v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 159 Miss. 14, 131 So. 541
(1931); Georgia Cas. Co. v. Alden Mills, 156 Miss. 853, 127 So. 555 (1930);
Washington Theatre Co. v. Hartford Ace. & Indemnity Co., 9 N. J.Misc. 1212,
157 Atl. 111 (1931) ; Westerland v. Argonaut Grill, 187 Wash. 437, 60 P. 2d 228
(1936) ; Fox Wisconsin Corp. v. Century Indemnity Co., 219 Wis. 549, 263 N. W.
567 (1935). See Woodhead, Insurance Against the Consequwnces of Willfil Acts,
INS. L. J.310:867, Nov. 1948.
' The Court in the Wolbarst case, supra note 6, argued that the result would
not encourage the assured in misconduct by the unanswerable logic that the assured
did not intend to injure anyone when he took out the policy. Obviously, it would
be more difficult to prove that the policy was taken out in contemplation of committing a willful injury than to prove that the specific act itself was willfully
inflicted. Moreover, where it could be shown that the assured had no such intent
at the time he obtained the liability insurance policy, the insurer would be required
to pay the third party even though the injuries were willfully and maliciously
inflicted and admittedly so.
8 See cases note 3 supra.
'Sheehan v. Goriansky, 321 Mass. 200, 72 N. E. 2d 538 (1947); Westgate v.
Century Indemnity Co., 309 Mass. 412, 35 N. E. 2d 218 (1941); Rothman v.
Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., 134 Ohio St. 241, 16 N. E. 2d 417 (1938) ; Herrell v.
-Hickok, 57 Ohio App. 213, 13 N. E. 2d 358 (1937) ; United Services Automobile
Ass'n v. Zeller, 135 S. W. 2d 161 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939). Cf. Huntington Cab
Co. v. Am. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 63 F. Supp. 939 (S. D. W. Va. 1945).
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clear from the actual facts that the injuries were intentionally inflicted,
that the unlawful conduct was no more than gross negligence.lo To
arrive at this result these courts consider that although the assured fully
intended to commit the act which caused the injuries, he may not have
anticipated or intended the injurious result.11
The second and more generally used approach where the facts are
appropriate is to find that the insurer is estopped to deny liability because of the existence of a judgment recovered in an action for negligence by the- deliberately injured third party against the assured.
Where there is such a prior judgment with execution returned unsatisfied, the injured person would succeed in an action against the insurer
in a majority of states,' 2 including North Carolina,' 3 for the reason
that the adjudication of negligence in the prior action is binding upon
the insurer, both as to the coverage of the policy as well as to the establishment of the original claim, regardless of whether or not the insurer
14
participated in the original action.
In an important recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit' 5 where the liability insurer sought a declaratory judgment that it was not liable for injuries deliberately inflicted
by its assured, the Court reached a decision directly opposed to the
weight of authority. The majority of the Court ruled that a judgment
in favor of the injured third person against the assured, although predicated on negligence, did not adjudicate negligence for the purpose of
policy coverage. 16 The insurer had not taken part in any capacity in
the prior action.
10 Am. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Werfel, 230 Ala. 552, 162 So. 103 (1935) ; Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co. v. Wolbarst, 95 N. H. 40, 57 A. 2d 151 (1948).
"1In addition to cases cited in note 10 supra, see Union Acc. Co. v. Willis, 44
Okla. 578, 145 Pac. 812 (1915) ; Shea v. Olsen, 85 Wash. Dec. 124, 53 P. 2d 615
(1936).
1" Miller v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 291 Mass. 445, 197 N. E.
75 (1935) ; Jusiak v. Commerce Cas. Ins. Co., 11 N. J. Misc. 869, 169 Atl. 551

(1933) ; Stefus v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co., 111 N. J. L. 6, 166 Atl.
339 (1933). Accord, Robbins v. Chicago, 4 Wall. 657 (U. S. 1866) ; E. I. Du Pont
de Nemours & Co. v. Guano Co., 297 F. 580 (4th Cir. 1924) ; B. Roth Tool Co. v.
New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 161 Fed. 709 (8th Cir. 1908) ; United Services Automobile Ass'n v. Zeller, 135 S. W. 2d 161 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) ; State Farm Mut.
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Wright, 173 Va. 261, 3 S. E. 2d 187 (1939).
Cf. State
Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Coughran, 303 U. S. 485 (1938).
" Jackson v. Maryland Cas. Co., 212 N. C. 546, 193 S. E. 703. After stating
the rule that the insurer would ordinarily be estopped by the prior judgment of
negligent injury, the court worked an estoppel against the injured third party and
held that the latter could not deny the willful nature of the injuries by reason of
the fact that the complaint in the suit against the assured alleged willful and intentional injuries. Cf. Distributing Co. v. Ins. Co., 214 N. C. 596, 200 S. E. 411
(1938); Campbell v. Cas. Co., 212 N. C. 65, 192 S. E. 906 (1937).
" Quaere whether this result is proper where the insurer took part in the
original action only to the extent of supplying counsel for the assured, or, a fortiori,
where the insurer took no part whatever in the original action.
" Farm Bureau Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 177 F. 2d 793 (4th Cir.
1950?, reversing 83 F. Supp. 383 (W. D. Va. 1949).
Parker, Chief Judge, dissented, following the reasoning of the prevailing
view. Farm Bureau Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Hammer, supra note 15 at 802.
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The correct solution is the more difficult to ascertain because of
strong, conflicting equities in the opposing parties. The third party
with a judgment against the assured should not be forced to retry the
facts and again establish the negligent injury. From his point of view
it would appear reasonable that the insurer be required to assert its
position in the original action, or thereafter be estopped to question the
nature of the injury. On the other hand, the insurer should not be
bound by a determination of negligence adjudicated in an action brought
by a stranger to the insurance contract, wherein the subject of policy
coverage was not directly involved and to which the insurer was not a
party. The alternative of intervention by the insurer in the original
action appears rather inadequate in view of the fact that its interests are
17
adverse to those of its assured.
The dilemma created by the conflicting equities of the injured third
party and the insurer is ordinarily resolved in favor of the former. The
Fourth Circuit case outlined above, in resolving the dilemma in favor
of the insurer rather than the injured third party, rejects the device of
estoppel by judgment, which has been the approach most frequently used
in reaching decisions favorable to third persons.
The third method by which courts justify a holding for a third party
intentionally injured is through construction of financial responsibility
statutes. One type of such statutes requires that all motorists maintain
liability insurance.' 8 Most such statutes, however, merely provide that
in the event of failure to satisfy a judgment arising out of accident in
the use, operation, or ownership of a motor vehicle, the motorist for-

feits his driving privilege pending satisfaction of the judgment and
proof by the motorist of his future financial responsibility.' 9 Under
either of the above types of statutes, regardless of whether the policy
was voluntarily taken out, it is uniformly held that injuries caused by
'Judge Parker observed that the fact that the insurer could assert in the
original case the intentional nature of the injury only with serious prejudice to
the defense of that case, meant merely that the defense which it had undertaken
was "difficult." Farm Bureau Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 177 F. 2d
793, 802 (4th Cir. 1950).
"Though there have been many attempts to pass statutes requiring insurance
for all drivers (e.g., eighteen bills were introduced in state legislatures in 1949),
Massachusetts is the only state which actually has in force such an act. Three
jurisdictions require liability insurance for certain poor-risk drivers: CONN. GEN.
STAT. §1561 (1930) (minors); HAWAIn REV. LAWs, §§7408, 7414 (1945) (minors);
R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN., c. 98, §3 (1938)

(minors and drivers having had two ac-

cidents). Compulsory insurance laws have been for years in effect in many
European countries. See Deak, Automobile Accidents: A Comparative Study of
the Law of Liability inLEurope, 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 271 (1931).
"9Some forty-four states and the District of Columbia have adopted some type
of financial responsibility law; lacking such statutes are Louisiana, Mississippi,
South Carolina and Texas. See Billings, Impact of Financial Responsibility on
Automobile Liability Insurance, INs. L. J. 323:871, Dec. 1949; note, Motor Vehicle
Financial and Safety Responsibility Legislation, 33 IowA L. Rnv. 522 (1948).
North Carolina's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act is found in N. C.
GEN. STAT. §§20-224 et seq. (1949 Supp.).
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the willful act of the assured are within the coverage of liability insurance where the policy was at the time of accident being used to certify
financial responsibility pursuant to the statute. 20 This result is both
logical and just. The purpose of the statute, the protection of the
traveling public from irresponsible motorists, is effected. At the same
time, the insurer is not subjected to any risk he could not reasonably
have foreseen and provided for by appropriate charges, and is subrogated
to the rights of the indemnified third party in all cases where coverage
would ordinarily be excluded by the terms of the policy were it not for
the effect of the financial responsibility statute. 2 1 Thus, the public is protected from irresponsible motorists without relieving the assured of
ultimate responsibility for his own willful misconduct.
Even where a liability insurance policy was not being used to certify
financial responsibility under the more usual type of statute, it has been
held that the insurer was liable to a third party for the assured's wrongdoing. 22 In this case the policy was worded to conform to the requirements of the responsibility act in the event that it should subsequently
be invoked, and the court ruled that this reference immediately incorporated the public policy of the statute into the insurance policy, thereby
enlarging coverage to include injuries dieliberately inflicted. 23 This result would appear readily avoidable by more careful drafting of policy
provisions guided by the light of experience.
Courts following either the first or third approach outlined above are
primarily concerned with redressing the injury of the innocent third
party, and only incidentally with the contractual relationship of the insurer with the assured. 2 4 They concede that the assured, bound by the
terms of his contract, has no right to be indemnified for his own willful
misconduct. But they hold the insurer liable, where the third party is
the claimant, by recognizing a subjective rather than an absolute concept
of coverage; that is, those which follow the "definition approach" view
coverage from the point of view of the claimant, and those which use
2 Compulsory insurance statute: Wheller v. O'Connell, 297 Mass. 549, 9 N. E.
2d 544 (1937). Note that the compulsory insurance act is not applicable to property damage, being intended to apply only to personal injuries resulting from the
faulty and tortious use of a motor vehicle on a public way.
Ordinary financial responsibility act: Ambrose v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 127 N. J.
L. 248, 199 Atl. 47 (1938). See 7 APPLEMAN, INsURANcD LAW AND PRACtIcE 72
(1942).
" Ocean Ace. & Guaranty Corp. v. Peerless Cleaning & Dyeing Works, Inc.,
10 N. J. Misc. 1185, 162 Atl. 894 (1932). See SAWYER, AUTOmomLE INsURANCE
132 (1936).
2 Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co. v. Wolbarst, 95 N. H. 40, 57 A. 2d 151
(1948).

"2Statutory provisions are held to supercede any conflicting terms in the in-

surance policy. Newton v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 107 F. 2d 164
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 309 U. S. 673, rehearing denied, 309 U. S. 698 (1939).
2 For an extensive discussion of the problems of financial protection for the
automobile accident victim, see 3 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 465-608 (1936).
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"construction of the statute" view coverage in the light of public policy.
Instead of viewing the third party strictly as a subrogee to the rights of
the assured, and therefor disallowing his claim against the insurer,2 5
they attribute to him rights independent of the assured, in effect treating him as a third-party-beneficiary. 26
On the other hand, courts which follow the second approach, estoppel by judgment, rather than basing their decisions on the actual terms
of the policy, are under no necessity of rationalizing their judgment for
the third party in terms of third-party-beneficiary or analogous concepts,
and in fact do reject any such theory. North Carolina 2" is one of this
majority of courts 28 which utilizes the estoppel by judgment approach
and rejects any suggestion that the third party has any greater rights
than the assured.
Automobile liability insurance is coming to be thought of more as a
social device for the reparation of injuries sustained than as a business
contract to be strictly construed for the protection of the assured. It
would appear that until liability insurance is required by law for all
drivers, the judicial attitude will seek to find coverage of intentional injuries in the policy itself, or estoppel to deny that coverage.
CLYDE T. RoLLINS.

Labor Law-Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949Suits for Unpaid Wages
A fundamental objective of the Fair Labor Standards Act' is to
secure for workers the wages which they are required to be paid. In
October, 1949, a new enforcement provision designed to further this
objective was added to the Act. This is Section 16(c), 2 which gives to
the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division the authority to

" See 8 APPLEmAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE 189-196 (1942).
2 New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Jones, 135 F. 2d 191 (6th Cir. 1943) ;

Franklin

v. Georgia Cas. Co., 225 Ala. 58, 141 So. 702 (1932) ; Indemnity Co. v. Bollas, 223
Ala. 239, 135 So. 174 (1931) ; Antichi v. New York Indemnity Co., 126 Cal. App.
284, 14 P. 2d 598 (1932) ; Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co. v. Wolbarst, 95 N. H.

40, 57 A. 2d 151 (1948).

See 8

APPLEMAN, INSURANcE LAW AND PRACTICE

196

(1942).
"7 State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. James, 80 F. 2d 802 (4th Cir. 1936)
MacClure v. Cas. Co., 229 N. C. 305, 49 S. E. 2d 742 (1948) ; Sears v. Maryland
Cas. Co., 220 N. C. 9, 16 S. E. 2d 419 (1941); Peeler v. Cas. Co., 197 N. C. 286,
148 S. E. 261 (1929).
"Farm Bureau Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 177 F. 2d 793 (4th Cir.
1950); Summers v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 109 F. 2d 845 (8th Cir. 1940); Clements
v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 41 F. 2d 470 (8th Cir. 1930); Royal Indemnity Co.
v. Morris, 37 F. 2d 90 (9th Cir. 1930) ; Guerin v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 107 Conn.
649, 142 Atl. 268 (1928); Coleman v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 247 N. Y. 271,
160 N. E. 367 (1928). See 8 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE 189-191

(1942).

'52 STAr. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. §201 et seq. (1946), as amended, 63 STAT.
910, 29 U. S. C. §201 et seq. (Supp. 1949).
263 STAT. 919, 29 U. S. C. §216(c) (Supp. 1949).
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supervise payment of employees' claims for unpaid minimum wages and
unpaid overtime compensation. And, under this section, the Administrator, with the written consent of the employee-claimant, may bring
suit to recover the amount of such claim, provided, "that this authority
to sue shall not be used by the Administrator in any case involving an
issue of law which has not been settled finally by the courts. .. ."
Prior to the enactment of this amendment there were three instruments of enforcement available for use against recalcitrant employers.
(1) Section 16(b) 3 gives to the employee the right to sue for unpaid
wages and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, plus a
reasonable attorney's fee. (2) Section 174. provides that the Administrator can get an injunction against employers found to be in violation
of the Act. (3) Under Section 16(a)15 the Administrator can obtain
fines and jail sentences for willful violators on a second offense. Section 16(c) adds a fourth procedure to this already impressive array of
sanctions.
As a matter of administrative practice the Wage and Hour Division
had usually requested employers to make voluntary restitution of unpaid
wages to employees. But this met with only partial compliance for
two reasons: (A) even if the employer voluntarily paid the wages due,
he was still subject to suit for the liquidated damages under 16(b);
(B) some employers chose to gamble that they might not be sued at
all-past experience had shown that many employees were reluctant to
secure an attorney and bring suit, so the employer simply sat tight,
gambling that employee inertia would persist long enough for the statute
6
of limitations to run on the claim.
Because employers were not making restitution voluntarily and because the Administrator was often powerless to require payment, the
Department of Labor favored the adoption of 16(c), giving the Ad7
ministrator authority to bring suit if requested by the employee to do so.
In some situations, however, the Administrator was in position to
require restitution. In 1948 the Supreme Court handed down its deci152 STAT. 1069 (1938), 29 U. S. C. §216(b) (1946).
'52 STAT. 1069 (1938), 29 U. S. C. §217 (1946), as amended, 63 STAT. 919, 29
U. S. C. §217 (Supp. 1949).
152 STAT. 1069 (1938), 29 U. S. C. §216(a) (1946).
'At the hearings, Mr. William R. McComb, Administrator of the Wage and
Hour Division, said: "The employer has found in many instances, I think, that
his employees will not sue him, and he has refused to pay voluntarily. We have
had a remarkable drop. We used to have voluntary payments from about 90 per-

cent of those we found in violation. They are now down to 30 percent. The em-

ployer just does not pay. He knows the employee probably will not sue him."
Hearings before Committee on Education and Labor on H. R. 2033, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. 115 (1949).
7Hearings before Committee on Education and Labor on H. R. 2033, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1949). Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 653, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1949).
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sion in McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co. In this case the Administrator instituted a civil contempt proceeding, alleging violations of a
prior (1940) district court decree which enjoined the Paper Company
from violating the minimum wage, overtime, and record-keeping provisions of the Act. In this proceeding the Administrator asked that the
Company be required to make payment of unpaid statutory wages to employees affected. The Supreme Court held that the district court had
the power to order the Company, in order to purge their contempt, to
pay to the affected employees amounts of wages which were unpaid in
violation of the Act.9
In the Jacksonville case the Court said, "We can lay to one side the
question whether the Administrator, when suing to restrain violations of
the Act, is entitled to a decree of restitution for unpaid wages."' 0
The Court did not have that problem before it; it was dealing there
with the power of the court to enforce compliance with its injunction.
But the question which the Court "laid to one side" in the Jacksonville
case was raised almost at once in McComb v. Frank Scerbo & Sons.11
In this case the Administrator sought an injunction and, as ancillary
relief, a contemporaneous order compelling the employer to pay unpaid
overtime wages to employees affected. The court of appeals held that
the order compelling payment was proper, citing the Jacksonville case
12
as authority.
The Administrator's victory was short-lived. Congress promptly
negatived the effect of the Scerbo case by inserting the following proviso
into Section 17: no court shall have jurisdiction, in any action brought
by the Administrator to restrain such violations, to order the payment
to employees of unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation or an additionalequal amount as liquidated danmages in such action.
This restricts the holding in the Jacksonville case to the precise situation there dealt with. That is, the Administrator can get an order requiring payment of wages only in contempt proceedings for enforcement
of injunctions issued under section 17 for violations occurring subsequent to the issuance of such injunctions. 13
Because existing wage collection machinery has proved ineffectual
in many instances, Section 16(c), which gives the Administrator authority to bring suit for unpaid wages, was proposed. The Department of
Labor and the unions supported its adoption, but many witnesses at
8336 U. S. 187 (1948).
9
McComb v. Crane, 174 F. 2d 646 (5th Cir. 1949).
0 336 U. S. 187, 193 (1948).
"177 F. 2d 137 (2d Cir. 1949).
12 The court said that the fact that the Supreme Court in the Jacksonville case
had expressly left open the question whether the Administrator could obtain an
order compelling restitution as ancillary to injunctive relief appeared to be "judicial caution, not the discovery of a vital difference." Id. at 139.
1" H. R. REP. No. 1453, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1949).
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the hearings vigorously opposed it.
Without expressing the obvious
objection that this power in the hands of the Administrator would be
another club to hold over the head of the employer, many witnesses
opposed the amendment as an improper enlargement of government
action. 15 But, administrative authority to bring suit on behalf of a
private claimant is no innovation in this country. 16 Many states have
had similar provisions for a number of years, 17 and indeed in some states
the mere existence of the authority to bring suit has been such an effective 'deterrent to violators that the power has seldom been resorted to.
But 16(c) as finally adopted was not in reality the amendment proposed by the Administrator, though both the House and the Senate
Committees reported out the section substantially as he had proposed
it.18 In conference the section was saddled with a proviso which restricts the Administrator's authority to bring a suit for an employee to
cases where the law has been settled finally by the courts.' 9 The pro"The witnesses invariably represented the views of management. Hearings

on H. R. 2033, supra note 7, at 226, 460, 582, 595, 954, 983, 1054, 1268, 1340, 1431,
1707.
" Mr. Peter T. Beardsley, Attorney, American Trucking Associations, had this
to say: ". . . We fail to comprehend any legitimate reason why any government
officer, no matter what his status, should be empowered to provide free legal services to a selected category of private litigants, at the expense of the general taxpayer." Hearings on H. R. 2033, supra note 7, at 595.
"0Instances of such authority were not unknown in federal legislation. 49 STAT.
2037 (1936), 41 U. S. C. §36 (1946) (Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act).
"' Strongest of the state statutes is that of Rhode Island which makes it the
"duty" of the director of the Dep't of Labor to institute actions for collection of
wages. R. I. Pub. Laws, 1941, c. 1069, §6(a).
In Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Oregon, New York, and Utah,
the appropriate administrative officer may, upon assignment of the wage claim to
him, bring "any legal action necessary to collect such claim." Wisconsin limits
this authority to claims of less than $100. ALASKA ComP. LAws ANN. §43-1-5(4)
(1949); CONN. GEN. STAT. §3796 (1949); HAWAII REv. LAws §4363 (1945);
MAss. ANN. LAWS C. 151, §20 (Supp. 1948); N. Y. LABOR LAW §199(2); ORE.
CoI'. LAWs ANN. §102-613(b) (1940) ; UTAH CODE ANN. §49-9-22 (1943) ; Wis.
STAT. §101.10(14) (1947).
In California, Illinois, Kentucky, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania, the appropriate administrative officer may bring suit to collect unpaid wages owing to women and minors. CAL. LABOR CODE §1195.5 (1943) ; ILL.
ANN. STAT. c. 48, §198.16 (Cum. Supp. 1948); Ky. REv. STAT. §337.360 (1948);
N. H. REv. LAws c. 213, §23 (1942) ; N. J.STAT. ANN. §34:11-56 (1940) ; OHIO
GEN. CODE ANN. §154-45s (1946); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §331(o) (1941).
In Arkansas, California, Nevada, and Washington, suit may be brought to
collect wages of persons who are financially unable to employ counsel. ARK. STAT.
§81-312 (1947); CAL. LABOR CODE §98 (1943); NEv. ComP. LAws ANN. §2751
(Supp. 1941); WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. §7596-1 (Supp. 1940).
New Mexico's statute gives the labor commissioner authority to sue for collection of wage claims When, in his judgment, the claimant is "entitled to the services
of the commissioner." N. M. STAT. ANN. §57-312 (1941).
And the South Carolina statute simply says that the labor commissioner shall
"cooperate' with any employee in the enforcement of his wage claim. The statute
does not seem broad enough to include authority to bring suit. S. C. CODE ANN.
§7034-6(6) (1942).
11 H. R. REP. No. 267, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1949); SEN. REP. No. 640.
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949).
"H. R. RE. No. 1453, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1949).
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viso was designed to prevent the Administrator from using his authority
to bring test cases involving new or novel questions of law.2 0 But the
difficulties which the proviso injects are at once obvious. The phrasing
of it supplies to ingenious defendants incentive to obscure the principal
issue with a smoke screen of preliminary questions as to whether the
case does, or does not, involve an issue of law which has been settled
finally by the courts. Does the proviso mean that the Supreme Court
must have ruled on the question? Or is it sufficient that certiorari has
been denied? Or is it enough that one of the courts of appeals has
ruled on the point? And what if there is disagreement among the
circuits ?2o4
Employee suits will continue to be an important instrument for collection of wages, 2 ' and the Jacksonville case still provides a means for
the Administrator to act as a collecting agent in a limited number of
situations. Section 16(c), inasmuch as it provides that when an employee accepts payment under the Administrator's supervision or consents to an action on his behalf by the Administrator, he waives his right
of action under 16(b) to sue for liquidated damages, should stimulate
voluntary payments by fair-minded employers who formerly did not
make payment voluntarily because they feared that a subsequent suit
for liquidated damages might be brought. But 16(c) may prove not to
be the panacea which the Administrator originally envisioned. The
full efficacy of the section, in view of the proviso limiting the authority
of the Administrator to bring suit to those cases in which the law has
been settled with finality, will depend upon a determination of what
the proviso really means. It is significant that though half the states
22
have somewhat similar statutes none of these is similarly restricted.
JAmEs L. TAPLEY.
Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Application to Airplane Accidents
Decedent, who also held a pilot's license, was permitted by the pilot
to ride in a dual control airplane which was to execute "precision spins"
as part of a demonstration of airplane maneuvers. The pilot was in the
instructor's seat when the plane took off, decedent being seated in the
rear seat. The plane, once aloft, began the maneuver, but instead of
pulling out of the spin and resuming level flight, it continued its downward movement until it crashed on the ground, killing both occupants.
In a suit brought by decedent's administrator to recover for wrongful
20 Id. at 32.
." See note, 63 HARv. L. R. 1078 (1950), which appeared after this note was in
proof.
2'The
Division can inspect each year less than 5% of the establishments now
covered by the Act. Hearings on S. 653, supra note 7, at 74.
" See note 17 supra.
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death from the pilot's employer, a nonsuit at the close of plaintiff's evidence was reversed by a divided court in Bruce v. O'Neal Flying Service.' The decision was based primarily on (1) the presumption that
the pilot, having been in control of the airplane when it left the airport,
continued to operate it until the moment of impact, despite the accessibility of the controls to the decedent, and (2) the expert testimony of
two pilots who witnessed the accident attesting to the safety of the
maneuver when properly performed. 2 Res ipsa loquitur was not mentioned. The -dissent regarded Smith v. Whitley,3 which refused to
apply res ipsa loquitur to an unexplained airplane accident and which
the majority endeavored to distinguish, as controlling the present case,
and emphasized the lack of positive evidence of the cause of the accident and of who was in control.
The apparently inconsistent results of the Smith and Bruce cases,
on almost identical facts, in deciding whether there was an inference
of negligence sufficient for submission to the jury raise the issue of the
applicability of res ipsa loquitur in North Carolina airplane accident
cases. Since an earlier note in 1943 in this LAw REVIEW 4 has dIealt
with its applicability to airplane disasters generally, its application prior
to the date of that note or in other situations in the law of negligence
will not be considered.
In accordance with the usual requirements, in order to invoke the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it must be shown that the accident would
not have occurred in the absence of negligence, that the airplane was
within the control of defendant, that plaintiff is not in position to know
the cause of the accident, and that the defendant possesses, or may acquire, superior knowledge as to the cause of the accident. 5
In recent years res ipsa. loquitur has been considered with regard to
aircraft accidents most frequently in cases involving private or noncarrier aircraft. Eight courts have rejected the doctrine either expressly0 or by implication. 7 On the other hand, in two cases, both of
' 231 N. C. 181, 56 S. E. 2d 560 (1949).
-2
.the

pilot ...

just overdid it a little bit too much ...

he tried to make it

too good. He just went too low."
223 N. C. 534, 27 S. E. 2d 442 (1943). The pilot and passenger survived the
crash and testfied respectively, "the plane went into a spin and crashed and I do
not know why," and "I don't know just why the plane crashed; it just came down
in a spin with the nose to the ground." A judgment of nonsuit was affirmed; the
court expressly stated that res ipsa loquitur did not apply to such accidents.
Note, 22 N. C. L. REv. 160 (1943).
5 Parker v. James E. Granger, Inc., 4 Cal. 2d 668, 52 P. 2d 226 (1934), cert.
denied, 298 U. S. 644 (1936).
'Morrison v. Le Tourneau Co., 138 F. 2d 339 (5th Cir. 1943) (plane with dual
controls; hence, no theory upon which jury could infer negligence; court said
case not to be decided solely by speculation of jury) ; Deojay v. Lyford, 139 Me.
234, 29 A. 2d 111 (1943) (while landing, plane swerved off of concrete runway, and
tail assembly struck and injured a workman; held, not analogous to car running
off highway because not unusual for airplanes to swerve in this manner when
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which concerned military aircraft, the doctrine has been indorsed and
applied. 8 Three of those courts rejecting res ipsa loquituro have been
confronted with crashes of dual control aircraft, as in the Bruce case,
and have based their decisions in part at least, on defendant's lack of
complete control.
The courts have been more amenable to the application of res ipsa
loquitur where air carriers have been involved. For example, in Smith
v. Pennsylvania Central Airlines Corp.-o the airplane crashed into a
mountainside while on a scheduled flight; the administrator of a delanding, and no inference of negligence therefrom); State for use of Piper v.
Henson Flying Service, 60 A. 2d 675 (Md. 1948) (res ipsa loquitur rejected because of evidence of decedent's negligence in failing to switch from empty to full
gas tank) ; Smith v. Whitley, 223 N. C. -534, 27 S. E. 2d 442 (1943) (not clear
whether carrier or non-carrier involved; facts would seem to indicate that it was
non-carrier) ; Towle v. Phillips, 180 Tenn. 121, 172 S. W. 2d 806 (1943) (plane
equipped with dual controls and therefore not completely within control of defendant).
Brewer v. Thomason, 219 S. W. 2d 758 (Ark. 1949) (ground observers testified that while plane in flight motor suddenly "went dead"; held, there must be
some evidence of negligence upon which verdict may be based; res ipsa loquitur
not alluded to) ; Hall v. Payne, 189 Va. 140, 52 S. E. 2d 76 (1949) (dual control
airplane crashed while in flight; testimony that immediately prior to take-off motor
did not appear to be functioning properly; held, jury may not decide case by conjecture or speculation; the court stated, "It is not contended that res ipsa loquitur
applies.") ; Neel v. Henne, 30 Wash. 2d 24, 190 P. 2d 775 (1948) (motor ceased
to operate immediately after plane took off; held, jury could determine cause of
resulting crash only by conjecture; res ipsa loquitur not mentioned).
8 San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States, 173 F. 2d 92 (9th Cir. 1949)
(Coast Guard plane observed flying continually at hazardously low altitude; five
seconds later, while not observed, collided with plaintiff's power line at altitude
of 187 feet; held, there was presumption of continuing negligence and rcs ipsa
loquitur applied); Yukon Southern Air Transp., Ltd. v. The King [1943] 1
D. L. R 305 (Ex. 1941) (while taking off, R. C. A. F. fighter plane collided with
plaintiff's empty passenger plane parked near runway, killing pilot).
'Morrison v. Le Tourneau Co., 138 F. 2d 339 (5th Cir. 1943); Towle v. Phillips, 180 Tenn. 121, 172 S. W. 2d 806 (1943) ; Hall v. Payne, 189 Va. 140, 52 S. E.
2d 76 (1949).
"076 F. Supp. 940 (D. D. C. 1948) ; accord, Bratt v. Western Air Lines, 169
F. 2d 214 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U. S. 886 (1948) (air carrier crashed on
scheduled flight killing plaintiff's decedent; plaintiff relied on res ipsa loquitur and
structural failure; held, doctrine properly applied, but jury verdict for defendant
affirmed) ; La Tour v. United Air Lines, Inc., 65 N. Y. S. 2d 839 (Sup. Ct. 1946)
(held, plaintiff's general allegations of negligence had effect of invoking res ipsa
loquitur, and defendant could not force plaintiff to give bill of particulars because
plaintiff may not have sufficient definite facts at his disposal) ; Maloni v. Trans
Canada Lines [1942] 3 D. L. R. 369 (Ont. C. A.) (while landing, air liner made
approach too precipitously; endeavored to pull up; crashed; killed all aboard).
Two courts have avoided a decision on the doctrine by ruling that inferences
of negligence were sufficient to carry plaintiff's case to the jury. Kamienski v.
Bluebird Air Service, Inc., 321 Ill. App. 340, 53 N. E. 2d 131 (1944), aff'd, 389
Ill. 462, 59 N. E. 2d 853 (1945) (evidence that cause of engine failure was defective cam gear; held, without alluding to res ipsa loquitur, failure of dclendant
to prove due care by mechanics who inspected cam gear justified verdict for plaintiff); Gill v. Northwest Airline, Inc., 228 Minn. 164, 36 N. W. 2d 785 (1949)
(air carrier crashed 40 miles off course; no survivors or witnesses; court ruled
that it was unnecessary to decide applicability of res ipsa loquitur because possible
for jury to infer negligence from fact that plane left established course and radio
beam without apparent cause).
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ceased passenger alleged specific acts of negligence and sought to invoke
res ipsa loquitur. The court held the doctrine applicable to crashes of
common carriers despite the allegations of specific negligence. In but
one case of this type has the court expressly repudiated it.11
It would seem that the doctrine has been invoked more frequently
in public carrier cases because of the requirement that an air carrier "is
bound to exercise the highest degree of practical care and diligence and
is liable for all matters against which human providence and foresight
might guard

. .

." ;12 the slightest deviation from this standard will raise

an inference of negligence.13 Some jurisdictions hold that an accident
involving injury to a passenger will immediately raise a rebuttable presumption of negligence on the part of the carrier.' 4 However, the
plaintiff injured in a private airplane crash benefits from no such presumption, and non-carrier operators and owners must exercise only
"....

the degree of care that men of reasonable vigilance and foresight

exercise in the practical conduct of their affairs." 15
The confusion in this field of the law has brought into sharp conflict
a governmental policy to encourage the development of commercial air
transportation, and the right of the passenger to redress for individual
injuries. Conceivably, a single crash of an air carrier could result in
judgments in favor of all of the passengers aboard, and thus produce
financial disaster for the defendant airline. 16 Hence, concern over the
role which could be played by res ipsa loquitur in effecting these paralyzing recoveries from an industry which has been promoted by direct
federal aid"7 and by the establishment of auxiliary services' 8 has fostered efforts to limit carrier liability.
"' Ortiz v. Eastern Air Lines [1948] U. S. Av. R. 623 (D. C. Md.) (Defendant's air liner suddenly plunged earthward in clear, quiet weather, carrying all
passengers to deaths. Plaintiff alleged negligence generally and endeavored to invoke res ipsa loquitur. Court dismissed the action, holding that the doctrine was
inapplicable because controlling state law repudiated it "in relation to a case of
this kind." The court cited Morrison v. Le Tourneau, note 6 supra, and approved
the reasoning therein, but it would appear that the cases are distinguishable on
their2 facts.).
" Law v. Transcontinental Air Transport, Inc. [1931] U. S. Av. R. 205 (E. D.
Pa.).
'" Kamienski v. Bluebird Air Service, 321 Ill. App. 340, 53 N. E. 2d 131 (1944),
aff'd, 389 Ill. 462, 59 N. E. 2d 853 (1945) ; DYIsmTA AND DYxsTRA, BusiNEss
LAW oF AviATioN 314 (1946); FixEL, LAW oF AviATION 182 (2d ed. 1945);
RHYNE,AvrATiON AccMENT LAW 44, 55 (1947).
"'Johnson v. Eastern Air Lines, 177 F. 2d 713 (2d Cir. 1949) (in refusing to
set aside verdict for defendant, held, in South Carolina and New York presumption of negligence rebuttable).
" Greunke v. North Am. Airways Co., 201 Wis. 565, 230 N. W. 618 (1930);
DYKSTRA AND DYKsTRA, op. cit. supra note 13 at 243; RHYNE, op. cit. supra note
13, at 57.
6Rieber, Some Aspects of Air Carriers' Liability, 11 LAW AND CoNm1M-P.
PROB. 524 (1946); Note, U. Cul. L. REv. 365 (1948).
1752 STAT. 998 (1938), 49 U. S. C. §486(b) (1946).
1852 STAT. 985, 986 (1938), 49 U. S. C. §452-457 (1946).
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Paramount among these efforts, and the most successful, has been
the Warsaw Convention of 1929.19 This agreement among the principal nations of the world, applying to international air transportation,
makes proof of negligence unnecessary 20 but relieves from liability the
carrier which proves that all necessary measures to avoid damage were
taken or that it was impossible to take them,2 ' and in the absence of
a showing of willful misconduct by the carrier, limits recovery to
$8,291.8722

The adoption of similar federal legislation -designed to protect the
interests of the passenger, carrier and public has been recommended. 28
While the suggested plans for limiting liability on domestic airlines
have varied, generally they have in effect called for a statutory declaration of res ipsa loquitur, at least insofar as plaintiffs are relieved from
proving specific negligence, and have established a fixed maximum on
recoveries, absent proof of willful misconduct. These proposals are an
adoption of the pattern and spirit of the Warsaw Convention for domestic purposes.
Air carriers, too, have instituted practices designed to curtail liability. It has become a universal practice for airlines, in contracting
with their passengers, to issue tickets stamped "Subject to tariff regulations." This apparently innocuous phrase, probably unnoticed by the
passenger, has the legal effect of advising him of the provisions and
requirements of the airline's tariffs and regulations on file with the
Civil Aeronautics Board, pursuant to statute, 24 as for example a requirement that notice of claim be filed or suit brought within a fixed period. 25
These provisions of the contract of carriage embodied in the tariff regulations are binding although rarely known to the passenger and virtually never to his personal representative.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has not yet been presented with
an air carrier situation in which it would be compelled to decide the applicability of res ipsa loquitur and deal with the concomitant problem of
policy and the limiting of airline liability. It may be expected, however,
that the unparalleled liberality manifested in the Bruce decision, in al20

49 STAT. 3000, U. S. TrATz SER. No. 876 (Dep't State 1929).
Ibid. Article 26. One seeking damages for death or injury to passengers

makes out a prima facie case upon showing a contract of carriage under the Convention,
that damage was suffered, and the amount of such damage.
1
2 Ibid. Article 20.
Ibid. Article 22.
2' Reiber, op. cit. mrupra note 16, at 535.
2'52 STAT. 992 (1938), 49 U. S. C. §483 (1946).
21 Brandt v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. [1948] U. S. Av. R. 637 (S. D. N. Y.)
(in wrongful death action court denied plaintiff's motion to strike airline's defense
that notice of claim not filed within 90 days of accident, or suit brought within
one year, as required by tariff regulations filed by carrier with CAB) ; accord,
Wilhelmy v. Northwest Airlines Inc., 2 Avi. 15,023 (W. D. Wash. 1949) (upheld
validity of 30-day notice of claim provision as reasonable).
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lowing an inference of negligence to go to the jury, will be duplicated a
fortiorari in air carrier cases, where reasons of policy reinforce the
result.
The refusal of some courts to apply res ipsa loquitur has resulted
from a feeling of uncertainty over the cause of the accident; Justice
Barnhill, dissenting in the Bruce case, quoted from the Smith decision
that "airplanes do fall without fault of the pilot," a statement originating
in 1933.26 While this statement still may be valid, though to a lesser
extent, it should not be concluded that the causes of airplane accidents
are so obscure as to defy determination.2 7 Recent reports of the Civil
Aeronautics Board indicate that less than .7% of all aircraft accidents
are of undetermined cause. 28 This would seem to demonstrate that
when airplanes collide or crash today, there is a determinable cause
which, when ascertained, may raise an inference of negligence, unavoidable accident, or act of God,2 9 and hence is a proper matter for jury
consideration.
It may be plausibly argued that the Smith case insofar as it refused
to apply res ipsa loquiturconflicts with the approach of the Court in the
Bruce decision since the Court in the latter case reached a result which
other courts, even those expressly applying the doctrine, have been
unable to reach in dual control situations. The finding in the Bruce
decision that there was an inference of negligence is subject to question
in view of the existence of dual controls and the absence of proof that
the pilot continued to control the airplane throughout the maneuver.
In any event, the submission of the inference of negligence to the jury
allowed to plaintiff the exact procedural relief which res ipsa loquitur is
designed to afford, and renders the Smith case of dubious value as a
precedent.
R. VINCENT SPRACKLIN.
"Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Dunlop, 148 Misc. 849, 266 N. Y. Supp.
469 (County Ct. 1933).
" RHYNE, op. cit. supra note 13, at 137.
"' Annual Report of CAB-Fiscal Year 1949. Of 7,465 non-air-carrier accidents,
only 47 (.6%) were found to be of undetermined cause, the major causes being
pilot error (76%), structural or engine failure (12%), and weather (5%); of
132 air carrier accidents the causes of only 2 (1.5%) were undetermined, the major

causes being pilot error (39%), structural or engine failure (28%), and inadequate0 maintenance (9%).
" While testimony and findings of the CAB concerning the causes of accidents
are not admissible in the courts, they are available to the public, and may advise
plaintiff of the most effective manner in which to present his case. 52 STAT. 1012

(1938), 49 U. S. C. §581 (1946).
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Negotiable Instruments-Forgery or False PretenseInsurance Coverage
Illogical, the laity would say, to hold that Dick Drawer of S Street
had committed a forgery by signing his own name in the presence of
T. Teller to a series of checks, thereby procuring all the funds deposited
in Drawee Bank by Dick Drawer of I Street. Logical, they would say,
to find that he had obtained the money by false pretenses. But the first
result would not be too surprising in legalistic circles, since it is a generally accepted principle that "one may commit a forgery by the use of

his own name if that name is used with intent to receive."'
At common law offenses analogous to these were classified under
the general denomination of "cheat," which was a fraud effectuated by
some false symbol or token. 2 Forgery, dependent upon a "writing,"

was called by a separate name because of its special heinousness.3 With
the enactment of statutes, -beginning with 30 Geo. II, c. 24, sect. 1, it was
realized that committing a fraud by false pretense was hardly less an
evil.4 Ensuing statutes defined and punished forgery0 and obtaining

money by false pretense0 as separate offenses.

The popular conception of committing the act of forgery is by the

attempted imitation in writing of another's personal act with the intent
to deceive7 while the committing of an offense by false pretense may be
'White v.Van Horn, 159 U. S. 3 (1895) ; United States v. Long, 30 Fed. 678
(C. C. S. D. Ga. 1887) ; Ex parte State ex rel. Atty. Gen. Williams v. State, 213
Ala. 1, 104 So. 40 (1924) ; People v. Rushing, 130 Cal. 449, 62 Pac. 742 (1900);
Barfield v. State, 29 Ga. 127, 74 Am. Dec. 49 (1895) ; Thomas v. First Nat. Bank,
101 Miss. 783, 58 So. 478 (1912); Segal v. Nat. City Bank, 52 N. Y. S. 2d 727
(1944), rev'd on other grounds, 58 N. Y. S. 2d 261 (1945) ; Int'l Union Bank v.
Nat. Surety Co., 245 N. Y. 368, 157 N. E. 269 (1927) ; People v. Peacock, 6 Cow.
72 (N. Y. 1826); Edwards v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. R. 50, 108 S. W. 673 (1908); 23
Am. JuR-, FORGERY §9 (1939); 37 C. J.S., FORGERY §9 (1943). See Stanley v
Beavers, 164 Ga. 656, 139 S.E. 345 (1927), 12 MINN. L. REV. 180 (1928) (Defendant, found guilty of forgery, asked for discharge on habeas corpus because the
name he signed to the instrument was his own. The court affirmed the conviction,
saying that was a matter of defense, which should have been set up on trial. One
dissenting judge said: "In view of the proof that the name signed by the accused
was his own proper name ....
I cannot reach the conclusion that he was guilty
of forgery.")
This principle tends to shock even lawyers when it is extended to such a case
as United States v. Nat. City Bank of New York, 28 F. Supp. 144 (S. D. N. Y.
1939). There the Veterans Administration sent by registered mail an adjusted
service certificate to a veteran, but it was delivered to another person of the same
name who indorsed as payee a check representing a loan secured on the strength
of the certificate, and it was held forgery ". . . though he indorsed without fraudulent intent, and in the belief that he was the payee named in the check."
'Williams v. Territory, 13 Ariz. 27, 108 Pac. 243 (1910) ; 2 BISHOP's CRIMINAL LAW

§141 (9th Ed. 1923).

'Williams v. Territory, supra note 2;
'Williams v. Territory, supra note 2;
IN. C. GEN. STAT. §14-119 (1943).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. §14-100 (1943).
'Mann v. People, 15 Hun. 155, aff'd,
State v. Lamb, 198 N. C. 423, 152 S. E.

2 BisHop, op. cit. supra note 2, §521.
2 BIsHop, op. cit. supra note 2, §411.
75 N. Y. 484, 31 Am. Rep. 483 (1878);
154 (1930).
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by a false writing, which may or may not be forged,8 by acts or conduct, 9
by spoken words,' 0 or by failing to speak when there is a duty to do
so." The distinction between these two crimes is that the essence of
forgery is the making of a false writing with the intent that it shall be
received as the act of another than the party signing it ;12 whereas, the
essence of obtaining money by false pretense is the acquisition of the
money' 8 by reason of false representations made with the intent to cheat
and defraud.
This distinction, however, becomes a subtle one when the ultimate
fraudulent act is predicated on a written instrument, and some cases
hold that when both offenses are of the same grade of crime, 14 the
guilty person may be proceeded against for either of them at the election
of the solicitor, 15 and a conviction or acquittal of one is a bar to a prosecution of the other.' 6 But if a distinction is not maintained, in addition
to the legislature being subjected to the imputation of having twice provided for the same crime,' 7 an anomaly would result in a situation which
expressly included one and not the other.' 8 A construction can be given
to each which will be in harmony with the statute provisions, and which
will preserve the well-known and understood difference between them' 9
if each situation is completely analyzed.
Though early cases pronounced this tangible distinction, and many
cases have since recognized it, such distinction has not always been followed. So it was easy enough for the North Carolina Supreme Court to
find ample authority for a holding that Drawee Bank sustained losses
through forgery in a "first impression" case20 involving the supposititious facts stated above. Drawee Bank had sued Insurance Co. on a
State v. Hobl, 108 Kan. 261, 194 Pac. 921 (1921).

Stecher v. State, 168 Wis. 183, 169 N. W. 287 (1918).

0

1 Ibid.
"1People v. Etzler, 292 Mich. 489, 290 N. W. 879 (1940), 25
(1940).
12 Goucher v. State, 113 Neb. 352, 204 N. W. 967 (1925).
12

MARQ.

L. RFv. 48

State v. Stewart, 9 N.D. 409, 83 N. W. 869 (1900).

Persons committing an offense under N. C. GEN. STAT. §14-100 (1943) or
"... . shall be guilty of a felony, and shall be
imprisoned in the state's prison not less than four months nor more than ten years,
or fined, in the discretion of the court ......
1' Harris v. State, 27 Okla. 331, 227 Pac. 845
(Cr. Ct. 1924). Loughridge v.
State, 63 Okla. 33, 72 P. 2d 513 (Cr. Ct. 1937) (".... the fact that the defendant
might have been charged with forgery is no reason for his not being charged under
the false pretense statute.") ; 2 Bisnop's CRIMINAL LAW §612 (9th Ed. 1923).
1"State v. Cross & White, 101 N. C. 770, 7 S. E. 715 (1888),
aff'd, 132 U. S.
131 (1889).
Mann v. People, 15 Hun. 155, aff'd, 75 N. Y. 484, 31 Am. Rep. 483 (1878).
'8 See Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. 231 N. C. 510, 57
S. E. 2d 809 (1950) where an indemnity bond was involved covering losses effected
by false pretense, but expressly not covering losses effected directly or indirectly
by forgery.
19
Mann v. People, 15 Hun. 155, aff'd, 75 N. Y. 484, 31 Am. Rep. 483 (1878).
oPeoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 231 N. C. 510, 57 S. E.
2d 809 (1950).
14

N. C. GEN. STAT. §14-119 (1943)
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policy issued by the latter to recover for losses resulting from paying
out the funds of Dick Drawer of I Street on checks signed by Dick
Drawer of S Street, who had no account in the Bank. The indemnity
bond expressly rejected coverage for losses caused directly or indirectly
by forgery, but did provide insurance against losses through false pretense. By disallowing recovery, it seems there were many blocks that
went to build S Street Dick Drawer's playhouse which the Court considered more as trimmings than foundation, and as a consequence disregarded many authorities, which would have warranted a contrary
result.
The cornerstone of this construction was laid when Dick Drawer of
S Street went with Paul Payee, who possessed a check previously drawn
by said Drawer, to Drawee Bank to have it cashed. Dick Drawer knew
he had no funds on deposit, and there is no evidence at this time that
he had ever heard of another Dick Drawer having an account there. He
had signed his own name, which happened also to be the name of another, with the intent to cheat and defraud the Bank by falsely representing that he had funds to pay the check-but certainly at that point
there was no forgery. 21 He stood by silently when Paul Payee was inquiring of the teller as to whether or not the check of Dick Drawer, the
very person beside him, was good. And when the teller cashed the
check, after verification by the bookeeping office, Dick Drawer's continued silence clearly constituted a false pretense. 2 He added another
block by immediately asking about "my balence," to which query the
teller informed him of the exact amount in "his" deposit. After this
one visit, and as a result of the presentation of the check, his acts and
conduct, his spoken words, and his failure to speak, the Bank believed
that Dick Drawer of S Street was its depositor. During the next four
months, this Dick Drawer came personally to the Bank many times,
inquired as to "my balance," had the teller or a companion write out
checks for him, signed them in the presence of the teller (never attempting to imitate the personal writing of Dick Drawer of I Street), and the
Bank cashed his checks. He never pretended to be anyone other than
the person living -at S Street, and known as Dick Drawer; in fact, he
even had the address of the account changed from I Street to S Street
so as to get the bank statements himself. Finally the house toppled when
Dick Drawer of I Street wanted to know why he had not been receiving
his bank statements,2 3 and upon investigation it was discovered that his
"' State v. Adcox, 171 Ark. 510, 286 S. W. 880 (1926) ; Goucher v. State, 113
Neb. 352, 204 N. W. 967 (1925).
222 Am. JuR., FALSE PRETENSE §455 (1939).
23 A remote question presents itself from this situation as to whether the real
depositor might have been considered negligent in not communicating to the Bank
his failure to receive bank statements for over three months. No case turning on
,hat point has been found, though there is some authority that the depositor is not
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account had been 'depleted by the well-laid plan of one with his same
name. All these events, when taken together, constitute a representation
that Dick Drawer of S Street owned the house he had built, and when
the Bank in reliance thereon paid him money on his checks, he had committed the offense of obtaining money by false pretense, 24 and not the
25
offense of forgery.
In the instant case, the Court said it was not concerned "with the
niceties which might be observed by the solicitor in choosing the subject
of prosecution-whether false pretense or forgery." 26 It seems that
niceties are of extreme importance since the insurance policy, under
which the Bank was claiming, covered losses resulting from false pretense and did not cover losses sustained by forgery. The contract involved was a standard Bankers Blanket Bond, and the pertinent coverage sections are as follows: "(B) Any loss . . . through ... false pretenses. (D) Any loss through accepting, cashing or paying forged or
altered checks. . . . Sect. 1. This bond does not cover: (a) any loss
effected directly or indirectly by means of forgery, except when covered
by Insuring Clause... (D). . . ." A rider was attached when amended
the bond: "(a) By deleting Insuring Clause (D) ....

(c) By deleting

from Sect. 1 the following: Under subsect. (a), '(D)' ... ."27 The
effect of this rider was to withdraw the insurance on any loss effected
directly or indirectly by forgery. The fact that the policy coverage included loss through false pretense and excluded loss through forgery
is an indication that the parties to the policy intended a distinction
between the offenses. And since the words were not defined in the
policy, is it not presumable that the parties intended they should have
bound to call for his statement or initiate an inquiry as to Whether or not there are

irregularities in his account. McCarty v. First Nat. Bank, 204 Ala. 424, 85 So.
754 (1920).
"Williams v. State, 33 Ala. App. 119, 31 So. 2d 590, aff'd, 249 Ala. 432, 31
So. 2d 592 (1947) (two justices dissenting) ; 9 ALA. LAW. 199 (1948) ; Hoge v.
First Nat. Bank, 15 Ill. App. 501 (1886) ; Murphy v. Hollowell, 204 Iowa 64, 214
N. W. 734 (1927) ; State v. Marshall, 77 Vt. 262, 59 AUt. 916 (1905) ; Martins v.
State, 17 Wyo. 319, 98 Pac. 709 (1908).
"' The Court cited Nat. Bank v. Marshburn & Cobb, 229 N. C. 104, 47 S. E.
2d 793 (1948), in its opinion in the case under discussion, and said: "We think
with reason, . . . [this case] . . . commits the Court to this view," i.e., that the

loss was sustained by forgery. That case was decided on the principle that if one
of two innocent parties must suffer a loss occasioned by some third person, the
negligent one must sustain it. The court, by analogy, said the same principle
would apply if the check involved had been forged, but it excluded forgery as a
ground of the decision.
"0It is of interest to know that Dick Drawer of S St. was indicted and convicted of obtaining money by means of false representations and false pretenses at
the January Term 1947, in the Superior Court of Edgecombe County, North Carolina, and sentenced to prison for a term of three to five years. On April 24, 1947,
he was" ordered released on findings of the State Hospital that he had the mental
age of four years. This all occurred prior to the institution of the action under
discussion.
27 Transcript of Record, pp. 16-18, Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Fidelity &
Casualty Co. 231 N. C. 510, 57 S.E. 2d 809 (1950).
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their popular meanings?28 Furthermore, the settled law in this and
other jurisdictions is that an indemnity bond is construed strictly against
the party issuing it and in favor of the party purchasing it.20 Therefore,
by giving proportionate importance to all the facts, by recognizing the
clear distinction between false pretense and forgery, by looking more
closely to the intent of the contracting parties, and by applying the rule
of construction in regard to contracts of this nature, the Court might
well have allowed a recovery by the Bank on its indemnity bond because
of a loss effected by false pretense. It seems that the Court fell a little
short of the mark when it found a "falsely written" instrument, immediately labelled the loss as the result of forgery, and concluded that it
was outside the coverage of the policy. It is conjectured that the Court
had a feeling that the Bank was grossly negligent30 in becoming ensnared in the framework of S Street Dick Drawer's playhouse, and thus
it should not be allowed to recover.
The Court's decision denying recovery to Drawee Bank is inevitable
conceding that its finding of forgery is correct. But this finding is questioned; for while it is true that one may be guilty of forgery if he signs
an instrument and passes it as the instrument of another whose name
is identical, here the essence of forgery is not present because the case
is devoid of evidence that the checks were represented or purported as
being made by any other than Dick Drawer of S Street. However,
this Dick Drawer by false pretenses obtained money from the insured
Bank, and it should be allowed to recover on its indemnity bond.
BARBARA M. STOCKTON.

Racial Restrictive Covenants-Damage Recovery for BreachShelley v. Kraemer Held Inapplicable
Since the United States Supreme Court ruled in Shelley v. Krae;ncrl
that state courts could not enforce racial restrictive covenants by injunction, there has been widespread speculation as to other methods whereby
8 In giving a construction to the terms in the policy, the court should seek the
usual meaning as it is employed in its common usage. Laird v. Employers Liability
Assurance Corp., 2 Del. 216, 18 A. 2d 86 (Ct. Oyer & Ter. 1941) ; Royal Ins. Co.
v. Jack, 113 Ohio St. 153, 148 N. E. 923 (1925). In the latter case, the court
said: "We are constrained to give that construction to the word 'theft' that is
understood by persons in the ordinary walks of life, and not the definition given it

by the Kansas Court-one unknown to the laity." VANCE ON INSURANCE §279
(2d Ed. 1930) ; 13 APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE §7384 n. 56 & n. 62

(1943).

2" 13 APPLEMAN, op. cit. supra note 28, §7401 n. 1 (1943) ; 44 C. J. S. INSURANCE, §297(c) (1) et seq., and citations (1943).

20 It is elementary that liability attaches if the drawee bank disburses the depositor's money other than on the depositor's order, however carefully the bank

acted. 7 Air. JuR., BANKS §506 n. 10 (1937).
1334 U. S. 1 (1948).
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the effectiveness of the covenants could be maintained. 2 One suggested
sanction received judicial support when the Supreme Court of Missouri
held in Weiss v. Leaon3 that Shelley v. Kraemer did not preclude the
award of damages for breach of racial restrictive agreements, and remanded the case for trial on that issue.
Shelley v. Kraemer held that state court enforcement of a racial
restrictive covenant constitutes a violation of the equal protection of
the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but nevertheless held
that such covenants are valid.4 Commentators have been of the almost
unanimous opinion that it also forbids a state court award of damages
for breach of such covenants. 5 The court in Weiss v. Leaon argued
that "the general rule of the law of contracts is well settled that in certain cases a breach of contract will give rise to two remedies, one an
action at law for damages, the other a suit in equity for specific performance." 6 They viewed Shelley v. Kraemer as merely -prohibiting

'For discussions of possible methods of avoiding or mitigating the effects of
the case, see Ming, Racial Restrictions and the 14th Amendment, 16 U. OF Cr. L.
REv. 203 (1948); Scanlan, Racial Restrictions in Real Estate, 24 NoTRE DAME
LAw. 157 (1948) ; Note, 27 N. C. L. REv. 224 (1949).
'225 S. W. 2d 127 (Mo. 1949).
'A valid contract is generally thought of as one which can be enforced in the
courts. Nevertheless, valid but unenforceable contracts are familiar in other fields
of law, e.g., where a suit for breach is barred by a Statute of Limitation because
of undue delay, and where an oral contract violates a Statute of Frauds which
requires certain types of contracts to be in writing to be enforceable. But there the
objectives causing their unenforceability are far different from the reasons which
make it unconstitutional to enforce racial restrictive agreements.
The propriety of holding a contract valid when it would be unconstitutional to
enforce that contract seems at least questionable. Certainly the precedents created
by the cases involving the above-mentioned statutes do not necessarily support such
a holding. Consider the following language from the decision of Von Hoffman
v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535, 552 (U. S. 1867), a case involving the impairment of the
obligation of contract section of the Constitution: "Nothing can be more material
to the obligation than the means of enforcement. . . . The ideas of validity and
remedy are inseparable, and both are part of the obligation... "
See the following: Note, 27 N. C. L. REv. 224, 230 (1949); Crooks, The
Racial Covenant Cases, 37 GEo. L. J. 514, 524-525 (1949) ; Lathrop, The Racial
Covenant Cases, 1948 Wis. L. REv. 508, 525, 527 ("Most certainly he [Mr. Chief
Justice Vinson] did not mean to say that the covenant could be enforced by the
obtaining of damages.") ; Ming, op. cit. supra note 2, at 235; Scanlan, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 182-183; Note, 48 COL. L. Rav. 1241, 1244 (1948) ("A narrow view of
the doctrine of the case might limit it to contract cases and even there to cases in
which injunctive relief rather than damages were sought. . . . But such an argument would be hardly tenable.") ; Note, 17 U. oF ClN. L. Ra,. 277, 282 (1948).
' Weiss v. Leaon, 225 S. W. 2d 127, 139 (Mo. 1949).
The following are cases which denied injunction but did award damages for
breach of the agreements involved: Jackson v. Stevenson, 156 Mass. 496, 31 N. E.
691 (1892) ; Bull v. Burton, 227 N. Y. 101, 124 N. E. 111 (1919) ; McClure v.
Leaycraft, 183 N. Y. 36, 75 N. E. 961 (1905); RESTATmaNmT, PROPERTY §528
(1944). See the critical discussion by Dean Pound in The Progress of the Law,
33 HAgv. L. Rav. 813, 820-821 (1920). It should be noted that in none of the
cases denying specific performance or injunction and awarding damages in lieu
thereof was the reason for denying the affirmative equitable relief sought the fact
that it would be unconstitutional for the court to enforce the contract.
Compare the following language from the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24, 36 (1948) (companion case to
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the suit in equity, but as not affecting the action at law for damages. 7
It is clear that when the covenants are effectuated through voluntary
aderence to their terms by the parties involved there is no state action.
Questions of what is forbidden state action and its exact scope must
await further Supreme Court -decisions for complete demarcation, But,
to hold that the state enforces through injunction and does not enforce
by awarding damages is to create a distinction valid only in the sense
that the former may be more effective in accomplishing the unconstitutional objective than the latter. Weiss v. Leaon operates to discourage
a breach of the covenant's terms by threatening a prospective vendor
with a pecuniary loss if he sells to one whom the covenant sought to
exclude. And this threat may be so deterring in effect that, for all
practical purposes, the result Shelley v. Kraemer sought to obviate will
remain a reality.

8

.W¥hen the state court awards damages for the breach of such a
covenant, the court lends its aid and authority to the consummation of
an otherwise incomplete individual act of discrimination. This constitutes that intervention of the state court, supported by the "full panoply
of state power," 9 which lies within the proscription of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The following language of Chief Justice Vinson, uttered
over a year before the Weiss case, presents an apt answer to the problem which that case considered: "The Constitution confers upon no
individual the right to demand action by the state which results in the
denial of equal protection of the laws to other individuals."' 1
There is no reason to believe that Shelley v. Kraemer was bottomed
on legal theory alone. Pressing social problems, especially those involving overcrowded housing and its many harmful consequences,." as

Shelley v. Kraemer, barring Federal court injunction): "An injunction is, as it
always has been, 'an extraordinary remedial process, which is granted, not as a
matter of right, but in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion.' Morrison v.
Work, 266 U. S. 481, 490 (1924). In good conscience, it cannot be the 'exercise
of a sound judicial discretion' by a federal court to grant the relief here asked for
when the authorization of such an injunction by the States of the Union violates
the Constitution . . . and violates it, not for any narrow technical reason, but for
considerations that touch rights so basic to our society, that, after the Civil War,
their protection against invasion by the States was safeguarded by the Constitution."
"Had the Supreme Court acceded to pressure urging them to declare the
covenants void rather than merely unenforceable, the damage question never would
have arisen. A void instrument obviously cannot form the basis for any judicial
relief.
' Even conceding that the "valid but unenforceable" label pinned on the racial
covenants is tenable (see note 4 supra), both the reasons for their unenforceability
and the general tenor of Mr. Chief Justice Vinson's opinion urge the conclusion
that anything other than purely voluntary adherence to their terms is not permissible. "You do not act voluntarily when to act otherwise your property would be
diminished by an execution issued by a court." Lathrop, op. cit. supra note 5, at
525. Also see Ming, op. cit. mpra note 2, at 217.
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 19 (1948).
0 Id. at 22.
" Numerous studies have demonstrated beyond cavil the menace to health and

1950]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

well as state court denial to Negroes of the privilege of ownership and
use of land, influenced the decision of the Court.12
Hinging decisions on subtle casuistries will not produce a satisfactory solution to problems in a field where experience more than adequately demonstrates the necessity for measuring methods aimed at
discrimination by their consequences rather than by their form. Disregarding the social and constitutional consideration which prompted
Shelley v. Kraemer, the Missouri court in Weiss v. Leaon has sought
to evade its responsibility with a distinction that is merely formal.
CHARLES L. FULTON.
Vendor and Purchaser-Duty of Vendor to Accept Assignee's
Notes and Mortgage
The defendant contracted to sell real property to the plaintiff's assignor. The contract stipulated that one-half of the purchase price
should be paid in cash and the remainder by notes secured by a deed
of trust, and that the seller would convey "to the purchaser, or assignee,"
upon the payment of the purchase price. The original purchaser assigned all of his rights under the contract to the plaintiff corporation,
of which he was president, and which tendered the cash and its own
notes and deed of trist. The defendant refused to accept the tender.
In an action for specific performance, held, nonsuit of plaintiff reversed.
The contention that such a contract necessarily imports that credit is
given alone to the person with whom the transaction is personally carried out, thereby making it unassignable, is untenable in the absence of
adequate expression in the instrument against assignment or some
circumstances judicially recognizable dehors the agreement.'
Contracts for the sale of land or for the sale of merchandise are
generally assignable and entitle the assignee to specific performance. 2
However, the undisputed rule is that the vendee cannot by an assignment of the contract compel the vendor to accept the credit of the assignee.3 Hence if the performance of the assignor is construed as being
morals, media for crime, delinquency, etc., which a policy of legalized ghetto
housing has caused. See, e.g., DRAKE AND CLAYTON, BLACK METROPOLIS (1945);
Woo-Ra, NEGao PROBLEMS IN CITIES (1928).
1" While the opinion of the Court does not refer to the sociological reasons
urged by many who filed briefs as amici curiae, opposing the covenants, the decision must be analyzed with regard to these pressures. The cases were not decided by a court unaware of the results which racial residential segregation produce. See Crooks, op. cit. srupra note 5, at 519.
2'Cadillac-Pontiac

Co. v. Norburn,
N. C. 23, 51, S. E. 2d 916 (1949).
N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-57 (1943) ; 5230
WILLISTON, CONTRAcrS §1439A (Rev. ed.
1937).
'Nelson v. Reidelback, 68 Ind. App. 19, 119 N. E. 804 (1918) ; Rice v. Gibbs,
40 Neb. 264, 58 N. W. 724 (1894); Atlantic & N. C. R. R. v. Atlantic & N. C.
R. R., 147 N. C. 368, 61 S. E. 185 (1908) ; Golden v. Tentzen & Schneyer, 92 Pa.
Super. 202 (1927); 2 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs §419 (Rev. ed. 1937).
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personal, the assignee cannot maintain an action for specific performance
without tendering performance of his assignor. The proper standard
for determining this would seem to be the intention of the parties as
revealed by the terms of the contract and by the surrounding circum4
stances.
In cases involving contracts similar to the one in the principal case,
one line of -decisions has held that the vendor may not be forced to
accept the notes and mortgage of the assignee. This result has been
reached even in contracts containing a provision that the agreement
would be binding on the assigns of the parties,5 as well as those without
such an assignability clause. 6 In the only previous North Carolina case
discovered, an option called for notes and a deed of trust signed by two
optionees, one of whom assigned to the other. The court held that the
optionor was entitled to the notes and deed of trust specified unless the
assignee tendered cash. 7 These decisions are based on an interpretation
of the contract to the effect that the vendor relied on the character and
financial responsibility of the original vendee as his security. "To
hold otherwise would render it possible for a vendor to have foisted
upon him a vendee whose financial responsibility in the case of deficiency judgment upon foreclosure he would not have accepted." 8 The
financial responsibility and character of the vendee being a substantial
inducement to enter the contract, to allow the assignee to compel the
vendor to accept his obligation would be to change the terms of the
contract.
A contrary view has been taken in at least two decisions which
have held that the vendor may be compelled to accept the notes and
mortgages of the assignee in place of those of the vendee.0 In these
two cases the courts interpreted the contract to mean that the mortgage
rather than the personal responsibility of the vendee was the material
'North Carolina Bank & Trust Co. v. Williams, 201 N. C. 464, 160 S. E. 484
(1931).

'Muller v. Raskind, 100 N. J. Eq. 258, 135 Atl. 682 (Ch. 1927), aff'd, 103
N. J. Eq. 20, 142 AtI. 918 (Ct. Err. & App. 1928); Lojo Realty Co. v. Johnson's
Estate, 227 App. Div. 292, 237 N. Y. Supp. 460 (1st Dep't 1929), aff'd, 253 N. Y.
579, 171 N. E. 791 (1930) ; Golden v. Tenzen & Schney, 92 Pa. Super. 202 (1927).
'Nelson v. Reidelback, 68 Ind. App. 19, 119 N. E. 804 (1918) ; Houncher v.
Salyards, 155 Iowa 509, 133 N. W. 48 (1911) ; Kutachenski v. Thompson, 101 N. J.
Eq. 649, 138 Atl. 569 (Ch. 1927), 28 COL. L. Rlv. 384 (1928) ; Adams v. Samuel,
82 Ohio App. 305, 75 N. E. 2d 493 (1947).
' Pearson v. Millard, 150 N. C. 303, 63 S. E. 1053 (1909). The court said that
the optionor had the right to have the contract accepted and executed according to
its terms, but she made no such claim or demand at the time of tender by assignee
and thereby waived this right.
'Lojo Realty Co. v. Johnson's Estate, 227 App. Div. 292, 237 N. Y. Supp. 460

(1st Dep't 1929), aff'd, 253 N. Y. 579, 17 N. E.791 (1930), 30 COL. L. REv. 420
(1930), 39 YALE L. J. 913 (1930).
Montgomery v. DePicot, 153 Cal. 509, 96 Pac. 305 (1908) ; Moran v. Borrello, 4 N. J.Misc. 344, 132 At]. 510 (Sup. Ct. 1926). Both of the contracts involved in these cases contained an assignability clause.
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inducement for its execution, and tender by the assignee of his own
notes and mortgage would suffice.
If the vendee intends to be free from further liability and the vendor
understanding this accepts performance by the assignee, the vendee is
discharged from further liability under the contract. Williston views
such a transaction as a proposed novation, which the vendor may always
refuse, rather than as an assignment.1 0
It seems manifest that the insertion of the assignability clause in a
contract indicates an acquiescence on the part of the vendor to the
assignment of the rights and duties under the contract by the original
vendee, but it is merely a contributing factor, never conclusive.' 1 On
the other hand in a case involving a contract with a clause expressly
denying the right to assign, the North Carolina Court said that restrictions on assignment do not apply when the contract is dearly objective
and gives clear indication that the personality of the parties is in no way
2
considered.'
The circumstances under which the agreement was made may also
be considered. It has been said that the vendor did not negotiate or
contract for the personal liability of the vendee where it appeared from
the evidence that the vendor did not know the vendee.' 3 In the principal case the holding of the court was reinforced by evidence that the
vendee was acting as the agent of the corporate assignee ift
the trans4
action.2
In case there is a foreclosure of the mortgage, the 'decree generally
provides that if the sale produces less than the amount due on the
mortgage, the mortgagor or other person liable shall pay the deficiency.' 5
Here, clearly, the financial responsibility of the vendee might have been
a vital inducement for the contract, and the vendor should not be compelled to take the credit status of the assignee in the place of the vendee
for the deficiency. But in North Carolina, by statute,' 6 the deficiency
" 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS

§420 (Rev. ed. 1937).

" Greenberg v. Schanger, 229 N. Y. 114, 127 N. E. 889 (1920) ; Swarts v.
Monagamult Electric Lighting Co., 26 R. I. 436, 59 Atl. 111 (1904); cf. Montgomery v. DePicot, 153 Cal. 509, 96 Pac. 305 (1908) ; 2 WILLISTON, CoNrRACTs
§423 (Rev. ed. 1937).
2 Atlantic & N. C. R. R. v. Atlantic & N. C. R. R., 147 N. C. 368, 61 S. E.
185 (1908).
' Carluccio v. Hudson St. Holding Co., 142 N. J. Eq. 449, 57 A. 2d 452 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1948). Specific performance denied on the ground that the contract
was obtained by fraud.
"' Cadillac-Pontiac Co. v. Norburn, 230 N. C. 23, 28, 51 S. E. 2d 916, 920
(1949). It is uncertain from the opinion whether the fact of the agency and the
intended use of the land by the corporation was disclosed to the vendor. It would
seem5 to have bearing only if the agency were known.
' TIFFANY, THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §942 (Zollmann's ed. 1940).
'o N. C. GEN. STAT. §45-36
(1943). In order to invoke the provisions of this
statute there must be a foreclosure sale of real property and it must be apparent
on the face of the evidence of indebtedness that it is for the balance of purchase
money for real estate.
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judgment on a note secured by a purchase money mortgage, or deed of
trust, has been in effect abolished. It might be said that the vendor,
being unable to obtain a deficiency judgment against the vendee, relies
on the mortgage, or deed of trust, for his security and not on the financial responsibility of the vendee. Therefore the duty to tender the
mortgage, or deed of trust, and notes evidencing indebtedness, may be
assigned and the vendor will be compelled to accept the assignee's performance. Two considerations, however, argue against compelling the
vendor to rely on a person other than the original vendee. The vendor
may have considered the financial ability of the vendee to pay the installments as they become due in order to avoid the necessity of a foreclosure sale. In addition, the character and reputation of fair dealing
of the vendee may have been bargained for, since if the value of the
land falls below the debt secured by the mortgage, or deed of trust, the
debtor, though financially responsible, may escape liability by an intentional default in payment.
The North Carolina Court holds that the note is the personal obligation of the debtor and the mortgage is a direct appropriation of property
to its security and payment.17. These remedies against the person and
property are entirely -different and while subsisting and concurrent,
resort may be had to either.' 8 Although there is no case in point, it is
conceivable that the vendor might avoid the effect of the deficiency
judgment statute by disregarding the mortgage and suing on the note
alone. Here, clearly, the vendor looks solely to the financial responsibility of the vendee for recovery.
ROBERT M. WILEY.

Morrison v. Chambers, 122 N. C. 689, 30 S. E. 141 (1898); Bobbitt v.
Stanton, 120 N. C. 253, 26 S. E. 817 (1897) ; Capehart v. Dettrick, 91 N. C. 344,
353 (1884).
"

' Capehart v. Dettrick, 91 N. C. 344, 353 (1884).

